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Can I automatically add a new host to known_hosts?
Non interactive git clone (ssh fingerprint prompt)Add remote host to known_hosts file without promptHow to auto accept new ssh fingerprints but decline changed?“Add correct host key in known_hosts” / multiple ssh host keys per hostname?Securely add host (e.g. github) to SSH known_hosts file?ssh-keyscan - still promoted with The authenticity of host '[hostname] ([IP address])' can't be establishedSSH failing from script, working on command line (Git)gitosis public keyError connecting to server through sshHow to remove strict RSA key checking in SSH and what's the problem here?How to make ssh match known_hosts to host/ip:port instead of just host/ip?Wiped out the known_hosts file on my server machine. Is it safe?gitosis public keySSH known_hosts holds duplicate keys for same serverssh-keyscan - still promoted with The authenticity of host '[hostname] ([IP address])' can't be establishedWarning: Remote host identification has changed (SSH)Securely add host (e.g. github) to SSH known_hosts file?validating virtual machine host automatically with fingerprint and something else
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Here's my situation: I'm setting up a test harness that will, from a central client, launch a number of virtual machine instances and then execute commands on them via ssh
. The virtual machines will have previously unused hostnames and IP addresses, so they won't be in the ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file on the central client.
The problem I'm having is that the first ssh
command run against a new virtual instance always comes up with an interactive prompt:
The authenticity of host '[hostname] ([IP address])' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is [key fingerprint].
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Is there a way that I can bypass this and get the new host to be already known to the client machine, maybe by using a public key that's already baked into the virtual machine image ? I'd really like to avoid having to use Expect or whatever to answer the interactive prompt if I can.
linux ssh known-hosts
add a comment |
Here's my situation: I'm setting up a test harness that will, from a central client, launch a number of virtual machine instances and then execute commands on them via ssh
. The virtual machines will have previously unused hostnames and IP addresses, so they won't be in the ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file on the central client.
The problem I'm having is that the first ssh
command run against a new virtual instance always comes up with an interactive prompt:
The authenticity of host '[hostname] ([IP address])' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is [key fingerprint].
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Is there a way that I can bypass this and get the new host to be already known to the client machine, maybe by using a public key that's already baked into the virtual machine image ? I'd really like to avoid having to use Expect or whatever to answer the interactive prompt if I can.
linux ssh known-hosts
4
For a test environment which is self-contained and physically secure, automated key acceptance may work just fine. But automatically accepting public keys in a production environment or across an untrusted network (such as the Internet) completely bypasses any protection against man-in-the-middle attacks that SSH would otherwise afford. The only valid way to make sure you're secure against MITM attacks is to verify the host's public key through some out-of-band trusted channel. There is no secure way to automate it without setting up a moderately complicated key signing infrastructure.
– Eil
Feb 15 '18 at 20:04
add a comment |
Here's my situation: I'm setting up a test harness that will, from a central client, launch a number of virtual machine instances and then execute commands on them via ssh
. The virtual machines will have previously unused hostnames and IP addresses, so they won't be in the ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file on the central client.
The problem I'm having is that the first ssh
command run against a new virtual instance always comes up with an interactive prompt:
The authenticity of host '[hostname] ([IP address])' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is [key fingerprint].
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Is there a way that I can bypass this and get the new host to be already known to the client machine, maybe by using a public key that's already baked into the virtual machine image ? I'd really like to avoid having to use Expect or whatever to answer the interactive prompt if I can.
linux ssh known-hosts
Here's my situation: I'm setting up a test harness that will, from a central client, launch a number of virtual machine instances and then execute commands on them via ssh
. The virtual machines will have previously unused hostnames and IP addresses, so they won't be in the ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file on the central client.
The problem I'm having is that the first ssh
command run against a new virtual instance always comes up with an interactive prompt:
The authenticity of host '[hostname] ([IP address])' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is [key fingerprint].
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Is there a way that I can bypass this and get the new host to be already known to the client machine, maybe by using a public key that's already baked into the virtual machine image ? I'd really like to avoid having to use Expect or whatever to answer the interactive prompt if I can.
linux ssh known-hosts
linux ssh known-hosts
edited Sep 1 '15 at 21:40
chicks
3,08072033
3,08072033
asked Apr 16 '10 at 4:15
gareth_bowlesgareth_bowles
5,97262838
5,97262838
4
For a test environment which is self-contained and physically secure, automated key acceptance may work just fine. But automatically accepting public keys in a production environment or across an untrusted network (such as the Internet) completely bypasses any protection against man-in-the-middle attacks that SSH would otherwise afford. The only valid way to make sure you're secure against MITM attacks is to verify the host's public key through some out-of-band trusted channel. There is no secure way to automate it without setting up a moderately complicated key signing infrastructure.
– Eil
Feb 15 '18 at 20:04
add a comment |
4
For a test environment which is self-contained and physically secure, automated key acceptance may work just fine. But automatically accepting public keys in a production environment or across an untrusted network (such as the Internet) completely bypasses any protection against man-in-the-middle attacks that SSH would otherwise afford. The only valid way to make sure you're secure against MITM attacks is to verify the host's public key through some out-of-band trusted channel. There is no secure way to automate it without setting up a moderately complicated key signing infrastructure.
– Eil
Feb 15 '18 at 20:04
4
4
For a test environment which is self-contained and physically secure, automated key acceptance may work just fine. But automatically accepting public keys in a production environment or across an untrusted network (such as the Internet) completely bypasses any protection against man-in-the-middle attacks that SSH would otherwise afford. The only valid way to make sure you're secure against MITM attacks is to verify the host's public key through some out-of-band trusted channel. There is no secure way to automate it without setting up a moderately complicated key signing infrastructure.
– Eil
Feb 15 '18 at 20:04
For a test environment which is self-contained and physically secure, automated key acceptance may work just fine. But automatically accepting public keys in a production environment or across an untrusted network (such as the Internet) completely bypasses any protection against man-in-the-middle attacks that SSH would otherwise afford. The only valid way to make sure you're secure against MITM attacks is to verify the host's public key through some out-of-band trusted channel. There is no secure way to automate it without setting up a moderately complicated key signing infrastructure.
– Eil
Feb 15 '18 at 20:04
add a comment |
15 Answers
15
active
oldest
votes
Set the StrictHostKeyChecking
option to no
, either in the config file or via -o
:
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no username@hostname.com
60
This leaves you open to man in the middle attacks, probably not a good idea.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:23
9
@JasperWallace, while this is usually good advice, the specific use case (deploying test VMs and sending commands to them) should be safe enough.
– Massimo
Oct 21 '14 at 17:33
8
This gives aWarning: Permanently added 'hostname,1.2.3.4' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
To avoid the warning, and to avoid the entry being added to any known_hosts file, I do:ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o LogLevel=ERROR -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null username@hostname.com
– Peter V. Mørch
May 21 '15 at 9:19
9
Downvoting as this does not answer the question and opens to serious security vulnerabilities.
– marcv81
Jan 20 '16 at 4:48
11
@Mnebuerquo: If you were worried about security then you wouldn't have anything at all to do with this question. You'd have the correct host key in front of you, gathered from the console of the system you wanted to connect to, and you would manually verify it upon first connecting. You certainly wouldn't do anything "automatically".
– Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
Jun 15 '16 at 17:31
|
show 6 more comments
IMO, the best way to do this is the following:
ssh-keygen -R [hostname]
ssh-keygen -R [ip_address]
ssh-keygen -R [hostname],[ip_address]
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname],[ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
That will make sure there are no duplicate entries, that you are covered for both the hostname and IP address, and will also hash the output, an extra security measure.
4
Why do you need all 3 ssh-keyscan's? Can't you get by with just the first one since it works for both hostname and ip?
– Robert
May 24 '13 at 22:00
6
Can you be sure that the machine replying to the ssh-keyscan request is really the one you want to talk to? If not you've opened yourself to a man in the middle attack.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:24
2
@JasperWallace Yes, for that you need at least the fingerprint or even better the public key, in which case you can add it directly to known_hosts, turning this question moot. If you only have the fingerprint, you will have to write an extra step which verifies the downloaded public key with your fingerprint...
– user68729
Apr 28 '14 at 21:57
1
Calls tossh-keyscan
were failing for me because my target host doesn't support the default version 1 key type. Adding-t rsa,dsa
to the command fixed this.
– phasetwenty
Aug 6 '14 at 18:11
4
This is probably a bad idea. You are opening yourself to a man-in-the-middle attack by updating these keys. To avoid duplicate entries, check the return status ofssh-keygen -F [address]
instead. medium.com/@wblankenship/…
– retrohacker
Sep 29 '15 at 3:04
|
show 4 more comments
For the lazy ones:
ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-H hashes the hostname / IP address
2
"ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts" produces an entry more like what ssh does with user interaction. (The -H hashes the name of the remote host.)
– Sarah Messer
Sep 4 '15 at 20:19
3
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the key fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
7
@Mnebuerquo You say what to do but not how, which would be helpful.
– Jim
Mar 24 '17 at 21:20
3
@jameshfisher Yes its vulnerable to MITM attacks, but have you ever compared the RSA fingerprint, which was shown to you with the actual one of the server, when you were doing this manually? No? So this answer is the way to do it for you. If yes, you shouldn't use this answer and do it manually or implement other security measures...
– fivef
Nov 30 '17 at 9:07
1
@Mnebuerquo I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:22
|
show 6 more comments
As mentioned, using key-scan would be the right & unobtrusive way to do it.
ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa HOST 2>&1 | sort -u - ~/.ssh/known_hosts > ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts
mv ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts
The above will do the trick to add a host, ONLY if it has not yet been added. It is also not concurrency safe; you must not execute the snippet on the same origin machine more than once at the same time, as the tmp_hosts file can get clobbered, ultimately leading to the known_hosts file becoming bloated...
Is there a way to check whether the key is in known_hosts beforessh-keyscan
? The reason is that it requires some time and additional network connection.
– utapyngo
May 23 '14 at 7:49
1
The original poster's version of this file hadcat ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
, but a subsequent edit changed it to>>
. Using>>
is an error. It defeats the purpose of the uniqueness in the first line, and causes it to dump new entries intoknown_hosts
every time it runs. (Just posted an edit to change it back.)
– paulmelnikow
Jul 27 '15 at 17:46
1
This is subject to the same MITM attacks as the others.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:18
@utapyngo ssh-keygen -F will give you the current fingerprint. If it comes back blank with return code of 1, then you don't have it. If it prints something and return code is 0, then it's already present.
– Rich L
Aug 17 '17 at 13:58
1
If you care that much about MITM, deploy DNSSEC and SSHFP records or use some other secure means of distributing the keys and this kludge solution will be irrelevant.
– Zart
Nov 28 '17 at 17:09
|
show 1 more comment
You could use ssh-keyscan
command to grab the public key and append that to your known_hosts
file.
3
Make sure you check the fingerprint to ensure it is the correct key. Otherwise you open yourself up to MITM attacks.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
3
@Mnebuerquo Fair point in the general context, but why would someone be trying to programmatically gather keys if they already knew what the correct key was?
– Brian Cline
Aug 25 '17 at 19:27
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
add a comment |
This is how you can incorporate ssh-keyscan into your play:
---
# ansible playbook that adds ssh fingerprints to known_hosts
- hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: no
tasks:
- command: /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan -T 10 ansible_host
register: keyscan
- lineinfile: name=~/.ssh/known_hosts create=yes line= item
with_items: ' keyscan.stdout_lines '
1
Are you uploading a known valid known_hosts file, or are you doing ssh-keyscan and dumping the output into known_hosts without verifying fingerprints?
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:22
1
This is simply dumps output of a keyscan, yes. So in effect it's the same as StrictHostKeyChecking=no, just with silent known_hosts updating without fiddling with ssh options. This solution also doesn't work well due to ssh-keyscan returning multiple lines which causes this task always be flagged as 'changed'
– Zart
Jun 16 '16 at 21:42
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
2
@jameshfisher I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one! Please let us know "how" to do it, if you think this is not the right way to do it!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:25
It is a perfectly valid method of adding values to known_hosts, but yes it is susceptible to MITM. However, for internal use it is fine.
– Cameron Lowell Palmer
Nov 23 '18 at 14:15
|
show 1 more comment
this would be a complete solution, accepting host key for the first time only
#!/usr/bin/env ansible-playbook
---
- name: accept ssh fingerprint automatically for the first time
hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: False
tasks:
- name: "check if known_hosts contains server's fingerprint"
command: ssh-keygen -F inventory_hostname
register: keygen
failed_when: keygen.stderr != ''
changed_when: False
- name: fetch remote ssh key
command: ssh-keyscan -T5 inventory_hostname
register: keyscan
failed_when: keyscan.rc != 0 or keyscan.stdout == ''
changed_when: False
when: keygen.rc == 1
- name: add ssh-key to local known_hosts
lineinfile:
name: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
create: yes
line: " item "
when: keygen.rc == 1
with_items: 'default([]) '
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
I had a similar issue and found that some of the provided answers only got me part way to an automated solution. The following is what I ended up using, hope it helps:
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o PasswordAuthentication=no 10.x.x.x
It adds the key to known_hosts
and doesn't prompt for the password.
1
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:23
3
Nobody checks the fingerprint.
– Brendan Byrd
Jun 2 '17 at 3:11
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
So, I was searching for a mundane way to bypass the unkown host manual interaction of cloning a git repo as shown below:
brad@computer:~$ git clone git@bitbucket.org:viperks/viperks-api.git
Cloning into 'viperks-api'...
The authenticity of host 'bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Note the RSA key fingerprint...
So, this is a SSH thing, this will work for git over SSH and just SSH related things in general...
brad@computer:~$ nmap bitbucket.org --script ssh-hostkey
Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-10-05 10:21 EDT
Nmap scan report for bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)
Host is up (0.032s latency).
Other addresses for bitbucket.org (not scanned): 104.192.143.2 104.192.143.1 2401:1d80:1010::150
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
| ssh-hostkey:
| 1024 35:ee:d7:b8:ef:d7:79:e2:c6:43:9e:ab:40:6f:50:74 (DSA)
|_ 2048 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40 (RSA)
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 42.42 seconds
First, install nmap on your daily driver. nmap is highly helpful for certain things, like detecting open ports and this-- manually verifying SSH fingerprints. But, back to what we are doing.
Good. I'm either compromised at the multiple places and machines I've checked it-- or the more plausible explanation of everything being hunky dory is what is happening.
That 'fingerprint' is just a string shortened with a one way algorithm for our human convenience at the risk of more than one string resolving into the same fingerprint. It happens, they are called collisions.
Regardless, back to the original string which we can see in context below.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
no hostkey alg
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-129
bitbucket.org ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-123
no hostkey alg
So, ahead of time, we have a way of asking for a form of identification from the original host.
At this point we manually are as vulnerable as automatically-- the strings match, we have the base data that creates the fingerprint, and we could ask for that base data (preventing collisions) in the future.
Now to use that string in a way that prevents asking about a hosts authenticity...
The known_hosts file in this case does not use plaintext entries. You'll know hashed entries when you see them, they look like hashes with random characters instead of xyz.com or 123.45.67.89.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa -H bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
The first comment line infuriatingly shows up-- but you can get rid of it with a simple redirect via the ">" or ">>" convention.
As I've done my best to obtain untainted data to be used to identify a "host" and trust, I will add this identification to my known_hosts file in my ~/.ssh directory. Since it will now be identified as a known host, I will not get the prompt mentioned above when you were a youngster.
Thanks for sticking with me, here you go. I'm adding the bitbucket RSA key so that I can interact with my git repositories there in a non-interactive way as part of a CI workflow, but whatever you do what you want.
#!/bin/bash
cp ~/.ssh/known_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts.old && echo "|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==" >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
So, that's how you stay a virgin for today. You can do the same with github by following similar directions on your own time.
I saw so many stack overflow posts telling you to programmatically add the key blindly without any kind of checking. The more you check the key from different machines on different networks, the more trust you can have that the host is the one it says it is-- and that is the best you can hope from this layer of security.
WRONGssh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no hostname [command]
WRONGssh-keyscan -t rsa -H hostname >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Don't do either of the above things, please. You're given the opportunity to increase your chances of avoiding someone eavesdropping on your data transfers via a man in the middle attack-- take that opportunity. The difference is literally verifying that the RSA key you have is the one of the bona fide server and now you know how to get that information to compare them so you can trust the connection. Just remember more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection.
I think this is the best solution to this problem. However, be very careful while using Nmap on something like Amazon EC2, I got a warning about the port scanning that Nmap does! Fill in their form before doing portscanning!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 5 '18 at 4:37
...well, yeah. I don't know why you would do the port scanning from EC2. If you are logged in to your account, you can just get the keys from the actual machines. This is more for machines you don't have control over. I would assume you would have a local machine not subject to AWS port scanning restrictions to use. But, if you are in that edge case situation where you must run nmap with AWS, I suppose this warning would be helpful.
– BradChesney79
Jan 15 '18 at 19:51
Using nmap to read the SSH host key from your workstation and then trusting that value is no different than connecting via SSH with StructHostKeyChecking turned off. Its just as vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
– Micah R Ledbetter
Feb 7 '18 at 17:40
...@MicahRLedbetter which is why I suggested that "more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection". But, that is my point. If you only ever check your target host from one set of environment conditions then how would you ever know of any discrepancies? Did you have any better suggestions?
– BradChesney79
Feb 7 '18 at 19:06
This is security theater. Doing something complicated to create the appearance of greater security. It doesn't matter how many different methods you use to ask the host for its key. Like asking the same person multiple times if you can trust them (maybe you call, email, text, and snail mail) . They'll always say yes, but if you're asking the wrong person, it doesn't matter.
– vastlysuperiorman
Jun 26 '18 at 17:28
|
show 1 more comment
I do a one-liner script, a bit long but useful to make this task for hosts with multiples IPs, using dig
and bash
(host=github.com; ssh-keyscan -H $host; for ip in $(dig @8.8.8.8 github.com +short); do ssh-keyscan -H $host,$ip; ssh-keyscan -H $ip; done) 2> /dev/null >> .ssh/known_hosts
add a comment |
The following avoid duplicate entries in ~/.ssh/known_hosts:
if ! grep "$(ssh-keyscan github.com 2>/dev/null)" ~/.ssh/known_hosts > /dev/null; then
ssh-keyscan github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
fi
1
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:42
I like this answer best. For scripting initial setup of a random VPS of no importance to anyone but me, MITM risk is vanishingly small. Infinitesimal quibble ... first line needs to bemkdir -p ~/.ssh/known_hosts;
– Martin Bramwell
Mar 5 at 23:00
add a comment |
To do this properly, what you really want to do is collect the host public keys of the VMs as you create them and drop them into a file in known_hosts
format. You can then use the -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=...
, pointing to that file, to ensure that you're connecting to the host you believe you should be connecting to. How you do this depends on how you're setting up the virtual machines, however, but reading it off the virtual filesystem, if possible, or even getting the host to print the contents of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
during configuration may do the trick.
That said, this may not be worthwhile, depending on what sort of environment you're working in and who your anticipated adversaries are. Doing a simple "store on first connect" (via a scan or simply during the first "real" connection) as described in several other answers above may be considerably easier and still provide some modicum of security. However, if you do this I strongly suggest you change the user known hosts file (-o UserKnownHostsFile=...
) to a file specific
for this particular test installation; this will avoid polluting your personal known hosts file with test information and make it easy to clean up the now useless public keys when you delete your VMs.
add a comment |
This whole
- ssh-key-scan
- ssh-copy-id
- ECSDA key warning
business kept annoying me so I opted for
One script to rule them all
This is a variant of the script at https://askubuntu.com/a/949731/129227 with Amadu Bah's answer https://serverfault.com/a/858957/162693 in a loop.
example call
./sshcheck somedomain site1 site2 site3
The script will loop over the names sites and modify the .ssh/config and .ssh/known_hosts file and do ssh-copy-id on request - for the last feature just the let the ssh test calls fail e.g. by hitting enter 3 times on the password request.
sshcheck script
#!/bin/bash
# WF 2017-08-25
# check ssh access to bitplan servers
#ansi colors
#http://www.csc.uvic.ca/~sae/seng265/fall04/tips/s265s047-tips/bash-using-colors.html
blue='33[0;34m'
red='33[0;31m'
green='33[0;32m' # 'e[1;32m' is too bright for white bg.
endColor='33[0m'
#
# a colored message
# params:
# 1: l_color - the color of the message
# 2: l_msg - the message to display
#
color_msg()
local l_color="$1"
local l_msg="$2"
echo -e "$l_color$l_msg$endColor"
#
# error
#
# show an error message and exit
#
# params:
# 1: l_msg - the message to display
error()
local l_msg="$1"
# use ansi red for error
color_msg $red "Error: $l_msg" 1>&2
exit 1
#
# show the usage
#
usage()
echo "usage: $0 domain sites"
exit 1
#
# check known_hosts entry for server
#
checkknown()
local l_server="$1"
#echo $l_server
local l_sid="$(ssh-keyscan $l_server 2>/dev/null)"
#echo $l_sid
if (! grep "$l_sid" $sknown) > /dev/null
then
color_msg $blue "adding $l_server to $sknown"
ssh-keyscan $l_server >> $sknown 2>&1
fi
#
# check the given server
#
checkserver() yes) ssh-copy-id $l_server
esac
fi
#
# check all servers
#
checkservers()
me=$(hostname -f)
for server in $(echo $*
#
# check configuration
#
checkconfig()
#https://askubuntu.com/questions/87449/how-to-disable-strict-host-key-checking-in-ssh
if [ -f $sconfig ]
then
color_msg $green "$sconfig exists"
ls -l $sconfig
fi
sconfig=~/.ssh/config
sknown=~/.ssh/known_hosts
case $# in
0) usage ;;
1) usage ;;
*)
domain=$1
shift
color_msg $blue "checking ssh configuration for domain $domain sites $*"
checkconfig
checkservers $*
#for server in $(echo $* | sort)
##do
# checkknown $server
#done
;;
esac
add a comment |
How are you building these machines? can you run a dns update script? can you join an IPA Domain?
FreeIPA does this automatically, but essentially all you need is SSHFP dns records and DNSSEC on your zone (freeipa provides as configurable options (dnssec disabled by default)).
You can get the existing SSHFP records from your host by running.
ssh-keygen -r jersey.jacobdevans.com
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 1 4d8589de6b1a48e148d8fc9fbb967f1b29f53ebc jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 2 6503272a11ba6d7fec2518c02dfed88f3d455ac7786ee5dbd72df63307209d55
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 1 5a7a1e8ab8f25b86b63c377b303659289b895736 > jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 2 1f50f790117dfedd329dbcf622a7d47551e12ff5913902c66a7da28e47de4f4b
then once published, you'd add VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
to your ssh_config or ~/.ssh/config
If/When google decides to flip on DNSSEC, you could ssh in without a hostkey prompt.
ssh jersey.jacobdevans.com
BUT my domain is not signed yet, so for now you'd see....
debug1: Server host key: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s
debug1: found 4 insecure fingerprints in DNS
debug1: matching host key fingerprint
found in DNS The authenticity of host 'jersey.jacobdevans.com (2605:6400:10:434::10)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is
SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s. Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? no
add a comment |
Here is how to do a collection of hosts
define a collection of hosts
ssh_hosts:
- server1.domain.com
- server2.domain.com
- server3.domain.com
- server4.domain.com
- server5.domain.com
- server6.domain.com
- server7.domain.com
- server8.domain.com
- server9.domain.com
Then define two tasks to add the keys to known hosts:
- command: "ssh-keyscan item"
register: known_host_keys
with_items: "ssh_hosts"
tags:
- "ssh"
- name: Add ssh keys to know hosts
known_hosts:
name: "item.item"
key: "item.stdout"
path: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
with_items: "known_host_keys.results"
add a comment |
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15 Answers
15
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votes
15 Answers
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votes
Set the StrictHostKeyChecking
option to no
, either in the config file or via -o
:
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no username@hostname.com
60
This leaves you open to man in the middle attacks, probably not a good idea.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:23
9
@JasperWallace, while this is usually good advice, the specific use case (deploying test VMs and sending commands to them) should be safe enough.
– Massimo
Oct 21 '14 at 17:33
8
This gives aWarning: Permanently added 'hostname,1.2.3.4' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
To avoid the warning, and to avoid the entry being added to any known_hosts file, I do:ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o LogLevel=ERROR -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null username@hostname.com
– Peter V. Mørch
May 21 '15 at 9:19
9
Downvoting as this does not answer the question and opens to serious security vulnerabilities.
– marcv81
Jan 20 '16 at 4:48
11
@Mnebuerquo: If you were worried about security then you wouldn't have anything at all to do with this question. You'd have the correct host key in front of you, gathered from the console of the system you wanted to connect to, and you would manually verify it upon first connecting. You certainly wouldn't do anything "automatically".
– Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
Jun 15 '16 at 17:31
|
show 6 more comments
Set the StrictHostKeyChecking
option to no
, either in the config file or via -o
:
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no username@hostname.com
60
This leaves you open to man in the middle attacks, probably not a good idea.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:23
9
@JasperWallace, while this is usually good advice, the specific use case (deploying test VMs and sending commands to them) should be safe enough.
– Massimo
Oct 21 '14 at 17:33
8
This gives aWarning: Permanently added 'hostname,1.2.3.4' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
To avoid the warning, and to avoid the entry being added to any known_hosts file, I do:ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o LogLevel=ERROR -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null username@hostname.com
– Peter V. Mørch
May 21 '15 at 9:19
9
Downvoting as this does not answer the question and opens to serious security vulnerabilities.
– marcv81
Jan 20 '16 at 4:48
11
@Mnebuerquo: If you were worried about security then you wouldn't have anything at all to do with this question. You'd have the correct host key in front of you, gathered from the console of the system you wanted to connect to, and you would manually verify it upon first connecting. You certainly wouldn't do anything "automatically".
– Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
Jun 15 '16 at 17:31
|
show 6 more comments
Set the StrictHostKeyChecking
option to no
, either in the config file or via -o
:
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no username@hostname.com
Set the StrictHostKeyChecking
option to no
, either in the config file or via -o
:
ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no username@hostname.com
edited Oct 3 '14 at 9:53
Jason
1356
1356
answered Apr 16 '10 at 4:34
Ignacio Vazquez-AbramsIgnacio Vazquez-Abrams
39.8k46377
39.8k46377
60
This leaves you open to man in the middle attacks, probably not a good idea.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:23
9
@JasperWallace, while this is usually good advice, the specific use case (deploying test VMs and sending commands to them) should be safe enough.
– Massimo
Oct 21 '14 at 17:33
8
This gives aWarning: Permanently added 'hostname,1.2.3.4' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
To avoid the warning, and to avoid the entry being added to any known_hosts file, I do:ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o LogLevel=ERROR -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null username@hostname.com
– Peter V. Mørch
May 21 '15 at 9:19
9
Downvoting as this does not answer the question and opens to serious security vulnerabilities.
– marcv81
Jan 20 '16 at 4:48
11
@Mnebuerquo: If you were worried about security then you wouldn't have anything at all to do with this question. You'd have the correct host key in front of you, gathered from the console of the system you wanted to connect to, and you would manually verify it upon first connecting. You certainly wouldn't do anything "automatically".
– Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
Jun 15 '16 at 17:31
|
show 6 more comments
60
This leaves you open to man in the middle attacks, probably not a good idea.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:23
9
@JasperWallace, while this is usually good advice, the specific use case (deploying test VMs and sending commands to them) should be safe enough.
– Massimo
Oct 21 '14 at 17:33
8
This gives aWarning: Permanently added 'hostname,1.2.3.4' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
To avoid the warning, and to avoid the entry being added to any known_hosts file, I do:ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o LogLevel=ERROR -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null username@hostname.com
– Peter V. Mørch
May 21 '15 at 9:19
9
Downvoting as this does not answer the question and opens to serious security vulnerabilities.
– marcv81
Jan 20 '16 at 4:48
11
@Mnebuerquo: If you were worried about security then you wouldn't have anything at all to do with this question. You'd have the correct host key in front of you, gathered from the console of the system you wanted to connect to, and you would manually verify it upon first connecting. You certainly wouldn't do anything "automatically".
– Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
Jun 15 '16 at 17:31
60
60
This leaves you open to man in the middle attacks, probably not a good idea.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:23
This leaves you open to man in the middle attacks, probably not a good idea.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:23
9
9
@JasperWallace, while this is usually good advice, the specific use case (deploying test VMs and sending commands to them) should be safe enough.
– Massimo
Oct 21 '14 at 17:33
@JasperWallace, while this is usually good advice, the specific use case (deploying test VMs and sending commands to them) should be safe enough.
– Massimo
Oct 21 '14 at 17:33
8
8
This gives a
Warning: Permanently added 'hostname,1.2.3.4' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
To avoid the warning, and to avoid the entry being added to any known_hosts file, I do: ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o LogLevel=ERROR -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null username@hostname.com
– Peter V. Mørch
May 21 '15 at 9:19
This gives a
Warning: Permanently added 'hostname,1.2.3.4' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.
To avoid the warning, and to avoid the entry being added to any known_hosts file, I do: ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o LogLevel=ERROR -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null username@hostname.com
– Peter V. Mørch
May 21 '15 at 9:19
9
9
Downvoting as this does not answer the question and opens to serious security vulnerabilities.
– marcv81
Jan 20 '16 at 4:48
Downvoting as this does not answer the question and opens to serious security vulnerabilities.
– marcv81
Jan 20 '16 at 4:48
11
11
@Mnebuerquo: If you were worried about security then you wouldn't have anything at all to do with this question. You'd have the correct host key in front of you, gathered from the console of the system you wanted to connect to, and you would manually verify it upon first connecting. You certainly wouldn't do anything "automatically".
– Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
Jun 15 '16 at 17:31
@Mnebuerquo: If you were worried about security then you wouldn't have anything at all to do with this question. You'd have the correct host key in front of you, gathered from the console of the system you wanted to connect to, and you would manually verify it upon first connecting. You certainly wouldn't do anything "automatically".
– Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
Jun 15 '16 at 17:31
|
show 6 more comments
IMO, the best way to do this is the following:
ssh-keygen -R [hostname]
ssh-keygen -R [ip_address]
ssh-keygen -R [hostname],[ip_address]
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname],[ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
That will make sure there are no duplicate entries, that you are covered for both the hostname and IP address, and will also hash the output, an extra security measure.
4
Why do you need all 3 ssh-keyscan's? Can't you get by with just the first one since it works for both hostname and ip?
– Robert
May 24 '13 at 22:00
6
Can you be sure that the machine replying to the ssh-keyscan request is really the one you want to talk to? If not you've opened yourself to a man in the middle attack.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:24
2
@JasperWallace Yes, for that you need at least the fingerprint or even better the public key, in which case you can add it directly to known_hosts, turning this question moot. If you only have the fingerprint, you will have to write an extra step which verifies the downloaded public key with your fingerprint...
– user68729
Apr 28 '14 at 21:57
1
Calls tossh-keyscan
were failing for me because my target host doesn't support the default version 1 key type. Adding-t rsa,dsa
to the command fixed this.
– phasetwenty
Aug 6 '14 at 18:11
4
This is probably a bad idea. You are opening yourself to a man-in-the-middle attack by updating these keys. To avoid duplicate entries, check the return status ofssh-keygen -F [address]
instead. medium.com/@wblankenship/…
– retrohacker
Sep 29 '15 at 3:04
|
show 4 more comments
IMO, the best way to do this is the following:
ssh-keygen -R [hostname]
ssh-keygen -R [ip_address]
ssh-keygen -R [hostname],[ip_address]
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname],[ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
That will make sure there are no duplicate entries, that you are covered for both the hostname and IP address, and will also hash the output, an extra security measure.
4
Why do you need all 3 ssh-keyscan's? Can't you get by with just the first one since it works for both hostname and ip?
– Robert
May 24 '13 at 22:00
6
Can you be sure that the machine replying to the ssh-keyscan request is really the one you want to talk to? If not you've opened yourself to a man in the middle attack.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:24
2
@JasperWallace Yes, for that you need at least the fingerprint or even better the public key, in which case you can add it directly to known_hosts, turning this question moot. If you only have the fingerprint, you will have to write an extra step which verifies the downloaded public key with your fingerprint...
– user68729
Apr 28 '14 at 21:57
1
Calls tossh-keyscan
were failing for me because my target host doesn't support the default version 1 key type. Adding-t rsa,dsa
to the command fixed this.
– phasetwenty
Aug 6 '14 at 18:11
4
This is probably a bad idea. You are opening yourself to a man-in-the-middle attack by updating these keys. To avoid duplicate entries, check the return status ofssh-keygen -F [address]
instead. medium.com/@wblankenship/…
– retrohacker
Sep 29 '15 at 3:04
|
show 4 more comments
IMO, the best way to do this is the following:
ssh-keygen -R [hostname]
ssh-keygen -R [ip_address]
ssh-keygen -R [hostname],[ip_address]
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname],[ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
That will make sure there are no duplicate entries, that you are covered for both the hostname and IP address, and will also hash the output, an extra security measure.
IMO, the best way to do this is the following:
ssh-keygen -R [hostname]
ssh-keygen -R [ip_address]
ssh-keygen -R [hostname],[ip_address]
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname],[ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [ip_address] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
ssh-keyscan -H [hostname] >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
That will make sure there are no duplicate entries, that you are covered for both the hostname and IP address, and will also hash the output, an extra security measure.
edited Sep 27 '11 at 22:14
answered Sep 27 '11 at 20:51
yardenayardena
2,3441105
2,3441105
4
Why do you need all 3 ssh-keyscan's? Can't you get by with just the first one since it works for both hostname and ip?
– Robert
May 24 '13 at 22:00
6
Can you be sure that the machine replying to the ssh-keyscan request is really the one you want to talk to? If not you've opened yourself to a man in the middle attack.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:24
2
@JasperWallace Yes, for that you need at least the fingerprint or even better the public key, in which case you can add it directly to known_hosts, turning this question moot. If you only have the fingerprint, you will have to write an extra step which verifies the downloaded public key with your fingerprint...
– user68729
Apr 28 '14 at 21:57
1
Calls tossh-keyscan
were failing for me because my target host doesn't support the default version 1 key type. Adding-t rsa,dsa
to the command fixed this.
– phasetwenty
Aug 6 '14 at 18:11
4
This is probably a bad idea. You are opening yourself to a man-in-the-middle attack by updating these keys. To avoid duplicate entries, check the return status ofssh-keygen -F [address]
instead. medium.com/@wblankenship/…
– retrohacker
Sep 29 '15 at 3:04
|
show 4 more comments
4
Why do you need all 3 ssh-keyscan's? Can't you get by with just the first one since it works for both hostname and ip?
– Robert
May 24 '13 at 22:00
6
Can you be sure that the machine replying to the ssh-keyscan request is really the one you want to talk to? If not you've opened yourself to a man in the middle attack.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:24
2
@JasperWallace Yes, for that you need at least the fingerprint or even better the public key, in which case you can add it directly to known_hosts, turning this question moot. If you only have the fingerprint, you will have to write an extra step which verifies the downloaded public key with your fingerprint...
– user68729
Apr 28 '14 at 21:57
1
Calls tossh-keyscan
were failing for me because my target host doesn't support the default version 1 key type. Adding-t rsa,dsa
to the command fixed this.
– phasetwenty
Aug 6 '14 at 18:11
4
This is probably a bad idea. You are opening yourself to a man-in-the-middle attack by updating these keys. To avoid duplicate entries, check the return status ofssh-keygen -F [address]
instead. medium.com/@wblankenship/…
– retrohacker
Sep 29 '15 at 3:04
4
4
Why do you need all 3 ssh-keyscan's? Can't you get by with just the first one since it works for both hostname and ip?
– Robert
May 24 '13 at 22:00
Why do you need all 3 ssh-keyscan's? Can't you get by with just the first one since it works for both hostname and ip?
– Robert
May 24 '13 at 22:00
6
6
Can you be sure that the machine replying to the ssh-keyscan request is really the one you want to talk to? If not you've opened yourself to a man in the middle attack.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:24
Can you be sure that the machine replying to the ssh-keyscan request is really the one you want to talk to? If not you've opened yourself to a man in the middle attack.
– JasperWallace
Sep 23 '13 at 7:24
2
2
@JasperWallace Yes, for that you need at least the fingerprint or even better the public key, in which case you can add it directly to known_hosts, turning this question moot. If you only have the fingerprint, you will have to write an extra step which verifies the downloaded public key with your fingerprint...
– user68729
Apr 28 '14 at 21:57
@JasperWallace Yes, for that you need at least the fingerprint or even better the public key, in which case you can add it directly to known_hosts, turning this question moot. If you only have the fingerprint, you will have to write an extra step which verifies the downloaded public key with your fingerprint...
– user68729
Apr 28 '14 at 21:57
1
1
Calls to
ssh-keyscan
were failing for me because my target host doesn't support the default version 1 key type. Adding -t rsa,dsa
to the command fixed this.– phasetwenty
Aug 6 '14 at 18:11
Calls to
ssh-keyscan
were failing for me because my target host doesn't support the default version 1 key type. Adding -t rsa,dsa
to the command fixed this.– phasetwenty
Aug 6 '14 at 18:11
4
4
This is probably a bad idea. You are opening yourself to a man-in-the-middle attack by updating these keys. To avoid duplicate entries, check the return status of
ssh-keygen -F [address]
instead. medium.com/@wblankenship/…– retrohacker
Sep 29 '15 at 3:04
This is probably a bad idea. You are opening yourself to a man-in-the-middle attack by updating these keys. To avoid duplicate entries, check the return status of
ssh-keygen -F [address]
instead. medium.com/@wblankenship/…– retrohacker
Sep 29 '15 at 3:04
|
show 4 more comments
For the lazy ones:
ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-H hashes the hostname / IP address
2
"ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts" produces an entry more like what ssh does with user interaction. (The -H hashes the name of the remote host.)
– Sarah Messer
Sep 4 '15 at 20:19
3
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the key fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
7
@Mnebuerquo You say what to do but not how, which would be helpful.
– Jim
Mar 24 '17 at 21:20
3
@jameshfisher Yes its vulnerable to MITM attacks, but have you ever compared the RSA fingerprint, which was shown to you with the actual one of the server, when you were doing this manually? No? So this answer is the way to do it for you. If yes, you shouldn't use this answer and do it manually or implement other security measures...
– fivef
Nov 30 '17 at 9:07
1
@Mnebuerquo I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:22
|
show 6 more comments
For the lazy ones:
ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-H hashes the hostname / IP address
2
"ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts" produces an entry more like what ssh does with user interaction. (The -H hashes the name of the remote host.)
– Sarah Messer
Sep 4 '15 at 20:19
3
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the key fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
7
@Mnebuerquo You say what to do but not how, which would be helpful.
– Jim
Mar 24 '17 at 21:20
3
@jameshfisher Yes its vulnerable to MITM attacks, but have you ever compared the RSA fingerprint, which was shown to you with the actual one of the server, when you were doing this manually? No? So this answer is the way to do it for you. If yes, you shouldn't use this answer and do it manually or implement other security measures...
– fivef
Nov 30 '17 at 9:07
1
@Mnebuerquo I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:22
|
show 6 more comments
For the lazy ones:
ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-H hashes the hostname / IP address
For the lazy ones:
ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-H hashes the hostname / IP address
edited May 15 at 12:10
answered Sep 25 '14 at 10:03
fiveffivef
99963
99963
2
"ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts" produces an entry more like what ssh does with user interaction. (The -H hashes the name of the remote host.)
– Sarah Messer
Sep 4 '15 at 20:19
3
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the key fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
7
@Mnebuerquo You say what to do but not how, which would be helpful.
– Jim
Mar 24 '17 at 21:20
3
@jameshfisher Yes its vulnerable to MITM attacks, but have you ever compared the RSA fingerprint, which was shown to you with the actual one of the server, when you were doing this manually? No? So this answer is the way to do it for you. If yes, you shouldn't use this answer and do it manually or implement other security measures...
– fivef
Nov 30 '17 at 9:07
1
@Mnebuerquo I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:22
|
show 6 more comments
2
"ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts" produces an entry more like what ssh does with user interaction. (The -H hashes the name of the remote host.)
– Sarah Messer
Sep 4 '15 at 20:19
3
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the key fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
7
@Mnebuerquo You say what to do but not how, which would be helpful.
– Jim
Mar 24 '17 at 21:20
3
@jameshfisher Yes its vulnerable to MITM attacks, but have you ever compared the RSA fingerprint, which was shown to you with the actual one of the server, when you were doing this manually? No? So this answer is the way to do it for you. If yes, you shouldn't use this answer and do it manually or implement other security measures...
– fivef
Nov 30 '17 at 9:07
1
@Mnebuerquo I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:22
2
2
"ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts" produces an entry more like what ssh does with user interaction. (The -H hashes the name of the remote host.)
– Sarah Messer
Sep 4 '15 at 20:19
"ssh-keyscan -H <host> >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts" produces an entry more like what ssh does with user interaction. (The -H hashes the name of the remote host.)
– Sarah Messer
Sep 4 '15 at 20:19
3
3
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the key fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the key fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
7
7
@Mnebuerquo You say what to do but not how, which would be helpful.
– Jim
Mar 24 '17 at 21:20
@Mnebuerquo You say what to do but not how, which would be helpful.
– Jim
Mar 24 '17 at 21:20
3
3
@jameshfisher Yes its vulnerable to MITM attacks, but have you ever compared the RSA fingerprint, which was shown to you with the actual one of the server, when you were doing this manually? No? So this answer is the way to do it for you. If yes, you shouldn't use this answer and do it manually or implement other security measures...
– fivef
Nov 30 '17 at 9:07
@jameshfisher Yes its vulnerable to MITM attacks, but have you ever compared the RSA fingerprint, which was shown to you with the actual one of the server, when you were doing this manually? No? So this answer is the way to do it for you. If yes, you shouldn't use this answer and do it manually or implement other security measures...
– fivef
Nov 30 '17 at 9:07
1
1
@Mnebuerquo I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:22
@Mnebuerquo I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:22
|
show 6 more comments
As mentioned, using key-scan would be the right & unobtrusive way to do it.
ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa HOST 2>&1 | sort -u - ~/.ssh/known_hosts > ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts
mv ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts
The above will do the trick to add a host, ONLY if it has not yet been added. It is also not concurrency safe; you must not execute the snippet on the same origin machine more than once at the same time, as the tmp_hosts file can get clobbered, ultimately leading to the known_hosts file becoming bloated...
Is there a way to check whether the key is in known_hosts beforessh-keyscan
? The reason is that it requires some time and additional network connection.
– utapyngo
May 23 '14 at 7:49
1
The original poster's version of this file hadcat ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
, but a subsequent edit changed it to>>
. Using>>
is an error. It defeats the purpose of the uniqueness in the first line, and causes it to dump new entries intoknown_hosts
every time it runs. (Just posted an edit to change it back.)
– paulmelnikow
Jul 27 '15 at 17:46
1
This is subject to the same MITM attacks as the others.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:18
@utapyngo ssh-keygen -F will give you the current fingerprint. If it comes back blank with return code of 1, then you don't have it. If it prints something and return code is 0, then it's already present.
– Rich L
Aug 17 '17 at 13:58
1
If you care that much about MITM, deploy DNSSEC and SSHFP records or use some other secure means of distributing the keys and this kludge solution will be irrelevant.
– Zart
Nov 28 '17 at 17:09
|
show 1 more comment
As mentioned, using key-scan would be the right & unobtrusive way to do it.
ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa HOST 2>&1 | sort -u - ~/.ssh/known_hosts > ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts
mv ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts
The above will do the trick to add a host, ONLY if it has not yet been added. It is also not concurrency safe; you must not execute the snippet on the same origin machine more than once at the same time, as the tmp_hosts file can get clobbered, ultimately leading to the known_hosts file becoming bloated...
Is there a way to check whether the key is in known_hosts beforessh-keyscan
? The reason is that it requires some time and additional network connection.
– utapyngo
May 23 '14 at 7:49
1
The original poster's version of this file hadcat ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
, but a subsequent edit changed it to>>
. Using>>
is an error. It defeats the purpose of the uniqueness in the first line, and causes it to dump new entries intoknown_hosts
every time it runs. (Just posted an edit to change it back.)
– paulmelnikow
Jul 27 '15 at 17:46
1
This is subject to the same MITM attacks as the others.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:18
@utapyngo ssh-keygen -F will give you the current fingerprint. If it comes back blank with return code of 1, then you don't have it. If it prints something and return code is 0, then it's already present.
– Rich L
Aug 17 '17 at 13:58
1
If you care that much about MITM, deploy DNSSEC and SSHFP records or use some other secure means of distributing the keys and this kludge solution will be irrelevant.
– Zart
Nov 28 '17 at 17:09
|
show 1 more comment
As mentioned, using key-scan would be the right & unobtrusive way to do it.
ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa HOST 2>&1 | sort -u - ~/.ssh/known_hosts > ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts
mv ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts
The above will do the trick to add a host, ONLY if it has not yet been added. It is also not concurrency safe; you must not execute the snippet on the same origin machine more than once at the same time, as the tmp_hosts file can get clobbered, ultimately leading to the known_hosts file becoming bloated...
As mentioned, using key-scan would be the right & unobtrusive way to do it.
ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa HOST 2>&1 | sort -u - ~/.ssh/known_hosts > ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts
mv ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts
The above will do the trick to add a host, ONLY if it has not yet been added. It is also not concurrency safe; you must not execute the snippet on the same origin machine more than once at the same time, as the tmp_hosts file can get clobbered, ultimately leading to the known_hosts file becoming bloated...
edited Jul 27 '15 at 19:55
kasperd
26.8k1252104
26.8k1252104
answered Mar 6 '12 at 9:00
ysawejysawej
51944
51944
Is there a way to check whether the key is in known_hosts beforessh-keyscan
? The reason is that it requires some time and additional network connection.
– utapyngo
May 23 '14 at 7:49
1
The original poster's version of this file hadcat ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
, but a subsequent edit changed it to>>
. Using>>
is an error. It defeats the purpose of the uniqueness in the first line, and causes it to dump new entries intoknown_hosts
every time it runs. (Just posted an edit to change it back.)
– paulmelnikow
Jul 27 '15 at 17:46
1
This is subject to the same MITM attacks as the others.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:18
@utapyngo ssh-keygen -F will give you the current fingerprint. If it comes back blank with return code of 1, then you don't have it. If it prints something and return code is 0, then it's already present.
– Rich L
Aug 17 '17 at 13:58
1
If you care that much about MITM, deploy DNSSEC and SSHFP records or use some other secure means of distributing the keys and this kludge solution will be irrelevant.
– Zart
Nov 28 '17 at 17:09
|
show 1 more comment
Is there a way to check whether the key is in known_hosts beforessh-keyscan
? The reason is that it requires some time and additional network connection.
– utapyngo
May 23 '14 at 7:49
1
The original poster's version of this file hadcat ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
, but a subsequent edit changed it to>>
. Using>>
is an error. It defeats the purpose of the uniqueness in the first line, and causes it to dump new entries intoknown_hosts
every time it runs. (Just posted an edit to change it back.)
– paulmelnikow
Jul 27 '15 at 17:46
1
This is subject to the same MITM attacks as the others.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:18
@utapyngo ssh-keygen -F will give you the current fingerprint. If it comes back blank with return code of 1, then you don't have it. If it prints something and return code is 0, then it's already present.
– Rich L
Aug 17 '17 at 13:58
1
If you care that much about MITM, deploy DNSSEC and SSHFP records or use some other secure means of distributing the keys and this kludge solution will be irrelevant.
– Zart
Nov 28 '17 at 17:09
Is there a way to check whether the key is in known_hosts before
ssh-keyscan
? The reason is that it requires some time and additional network connection.– utapyngo
May 23 '14 at 7:49
Is there a way to check whether the key is in known_hosts before
ssh-keyscan
? The reason is that it requires some time and additional network connection.– utapyngo
May 23 '14 at 7:49
1
1
The original poster's version of this file had
cat ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
, but a subsequent edit changed it to >>
. Using >>
is an error. It defeats the purpose of the uniqueness in the first line, and causes it to dump new entries into known_hosts
every time it runs. (Just posted an edit to change it back.)– paulmelnikow
Jul 27 '15 at 17:46
The original poster's version of this file had
cat ~/.ssh/tmp_hosts > ~/.ssh/known_hosts
, but a subsequent edit changed it to >>
. Using >>
is an error. It defeats the purpose of the uniqueness in the first line, and causes it to dump new entries into known_hosts
every time it runs. (Just posted an edit to change it back.)– paulmelnikow
Jul 27 '15 at 17:46
1
1
This is subject to the same MITM attacks as the others.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:18
This is subject to the same MITM attacks as the others.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:18
@utapyngo ssh-keygen -F will give you the current fingerprint. If it comes back blank with return code of 1, then you don't have it. If it prints something and return code is 0, then it's already present.
– Rich L
Aug 17 '17 at 13:58
@utapyngo ssh-keygen -F will give you the current fingerprint. If it comes back blank with return code of 1, then you don't have it. If it prints something and return code is 0, then it's already present.
– Rich L
Aug 17 '17 at 13:58
1
1
If you care that much about MITM, deploy DNSSEC and SSHFP records or use some other secure means of distributing the keys and this kludge solution will be irrelevant.
– Zart
Nov 28 '17 at 17:09
If you care that much about MITM, deploy DNSSEC and SSHFP records or use some other secure means of distributing the keys and this kludge solution will be irrelevant.
– Zart
Nov 28 '17 at 17:09
|
show 1 more comment
You could use ssh-keyscan
command to grab the public key and append that to your known_hosts
file.
3
Make sure you check the fingerprint to ensure it is the correct key. Otherwise you open yourself up to MITM attacks.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
3
@Mnebuerquo Fair point in the general context, but why would someone be trying to programmatically gather keys if they already knew what the correct key was?
– Brian Cline
Aug 25 '17 at 19:27
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
add a comment |
You could use ssh-keyscan
command to grab the public key and append that to your known_hosts
file.
3
Make sure you check the fingerprint to ensure it is the correct key. Otherwise you open yourself up to MITM attacks.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
3
@Mnebuerquo Fair point in the general context, but why would someone be trying to programmatically gather keys if they already knew what the correct key was?
– Brian Cline
Aug 25 '17 at 19:27
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
add a comment |
You could use ssh-keyscan
command to grab the public key and append that to your known_hosts
file.
You could use ssh-keyscan
command to grab the public key and append that to your known_hosts
file.
edited Sep 21 '15 at 21:08
kenorb
3,2933042
3,2933042
answered Apr 16 '10 at 5:09
AlexAlex
5,94311731
5,94311731
3
Make sure you check the fingerprint to ensure it is the correct key. Otherwise you open yourself up to MITM attacks.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
3
@Mnebuerquo Fair point in the general context, but why would someone be trying to programmatically gather keys if they already knew what the correct key was?
– Brian Cline
Aug 25 '17 at 19:27
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
add a comment |
3
Make sure you check the fingerprint to ensure it is the correct key. Otherwise you open yourself up to MITM attacks.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
3
@Mnebuerquo Fair point in the general context, but why would someone be trying to programmatically gather keys if they already knew what the correct key was?
– Brian Cline
Aug 25 '17 at 19:27
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
3
3
Make sure you check the fingerprint to ensure it is the correct key. Otherwise you open yourself up to MITM attacks.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
Make sure you check the fingerprint to ensure it is the correct key. Otherwise you open yourself up to MITM attacks.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:20
3
3
@Mnebuerquo Fair point in the general context, but why would someone be trying to programmatically gather keys if they already knew what the correct key was?
– Brian Cline
Aug 25 '17 at 19:27
@Mnebuerquo Fair point in the general context, but why would someone be trying to programmatically gather keys if they already knew what the correct key was?
– Brian Cline
Aug 25 '17 at 19:27
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
add a comment |
This is how you can incorporate ssh-keyscan into your play:
---
# ansible playbook that adds ssh fingerprints to known_hosts
- hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: no
tasks:
- command: /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan -T 10 ansible_host
register: keyscan
- lineinfile: name=~/.ssh/known_hosts create=yes line= item
with_items: ' keyscan.stdout_lines '
1
Are you uploading a known valid known_hosts file, or are you doing ssh-keyscan and dumping the output into known_hosts without verifying fingerprints?
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:22
1
This is simply dumps output of a keyscan, yes. So in effect it's the same as StrictHostKeyChecking=no, just with silent known_hosts updating without fiddling with ssh options. This solution also doesn't work well due to ssh-keyscan returning multiple lines which causes this task always be flagged as 'changed'
– Zart
Jun 16 '16 at 21:42
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
2
@jameshfisher I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one! Please let us know "how" to do it, if you think this is not the right way to do it!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:25
It is a perfectly valid method of adding values to known_hosts, but yes it is susceptible to MITM. However, for internal use it is fine.
– Cameron Lowell Palmer
Nov 23 '18 at 14:15
|
show 1 more comment
This is how you can incorporate ssh-keyscan into your play:
---
# ansible playbook that adds ssh fingerprints to known_hosts
- hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: no
tasks:
- command: /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan -T 10 ansible_host
register: keyscan
- lineinfile: name=~/.ssh/known_hosts create=yes line= item
with_items: ' keyscan.stdout_lines '
1
Are you uploading a known valid known_hosts file, or are you doing ssh-keyscan and dumping the output into known_hosts without verifying fingerprints?
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:22
1
This is simply dumps output of a keyscan, yes. So in effect it's the same as StrictHostKeyChecking=no, just with silent known_hosts updating without fiddling with ssh options. This solution also doesn't work well due to ssh-keyscan returning multiple lines which causes this task always be flagged as 'changed'
– Zart
Jun 16 '16 at 21:42
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
2
@jameshfisher I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one! Please let us know "how" to do it, if you think this is not the right way to do it!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:25
It is a perfectly valid method of adding values to known_hosts, but yes it is susceptible to MITM. However, for internal use it is fine.
– Cameron Lowell Palmer
Nov 23 '18 at 14:15
|
show 1 more comment
This is how you can incorporate ssh-keyscan into your play:
---
# ansible playbook that adds ssh fingerprints to known_hosts
- hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: no
tasks:
- command: /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan -T 10 ansible_host
register: keyscan
- lineinfile: name=~/.ssh/known_hosts create=yes line= item
with_items: ' keyscan.stdout_lines '
This is how you can incorporate ssh-keyscan into your play:
---
# ansible playbook that adds ssh fingerprints to known_hosts
- hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: no
tasks:
- command: /usr/bin/ssh-keyscan -T 10 ansible_host
register: keyscan
- lineinfile: name=~/.ssh/known_hosts create=yes line= item
with_items: ' keyscan.stdout_lines '
answered Feb 3 '16 at 3:12
ZartZart
29436
29436
1
Are you uploading a known valid known_hosts file, or are you doing ssh-keyscan and dumping the output into known_hosts without verifying fingerprints?
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:22
1
This is simply dumps output of a keyscan, yes. So in effect it's the same as StrictHostKeyChecking=no, just with silent known_hosts updating without fiddling with ssh options. This solution also doesn't work well due to ssh-keyscan returning multiple lines which causes this task always be flagged as 'changed'
– Zart
Jun 16 '16 at 21:42
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
2
@jameshfisher I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one! Please let us know "how" to do it, if you think this is not the right way to do it!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:25
It is a perfectly valid method of adding values to known_hosts, but yes it is susceptible to MITM. However, for internal use it is fine.
– Cameron Lowell Palmer
Nov 23 '18 at 14:15
|
show 1 more comment
1
Are you uploading a known valid known_hosts file, or are you doing ssh-keyscan and dumping the output into known_hosts without verifying fingerprints?
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:22
1
This is simply dumps output of a keyscan, yes. So in effect it's the same as StrictHostKeyChecking=no, just with silent known_hosts updating without fiddling with ssh options. This solution also doesn't work well due to ssh-keyscan returning multiple lines which causes this task always be flagged as 'changed'
– Zart
Jun 16 '16 at 21:42
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
2
@jameshfisher I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one! Please let us know "how" to do it, if you think this is not the right way to do it!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:25
It is a perfectly valid method of adding values to known_hosts, but yes it is susceptible to MITM. However, for internal use it is fine.
– Cameron Lowell Palmer
Nov 23 '18 at 14:15
1
1
Are you uploading a known valid known_hosts file, or are you doing ssh-keyscan and dumping the output into known_hosts without verifying fingerprints?
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:22
Are you uploading a known valid known_hosts file, or are you doing ssh-keyscan and dumping the output into known_hosts without verifying fingerprints?
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:22
1
1
This is simply dumps output of a keyscan, yes. So in effect it's the same as StrictHostKeyChecking=no, just with silent known_hosts updating without fiddling with ssh options. This solution also doesn't work well due to ssh-keyscan returning multiple lines which causes this task always be flagged as 'changed'
– Zart
Jun 16 '16 at 21:42
This is simply dumps output of a keyscan, yes. So in effect it's the same as StrictHostKeyChecking=no, just with silent known_hosts updating without fiddling with ssh options. This solution also doesn't work well due to ssh-keyscan returning multiple lines which causes this task always be flagged as 'changed'
– Zart
Jun 16 '16 at 21:42
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:39
2
2
@jameshfisher I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one! Please let us know "how" to do it, if you think this is not the right way to do it!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:25
@jameshfisher I would be really glad if you also let us know a better way to handle this, when we need to clone a repo using batch scripts un-attended and we want to by-pass this prompt. Please shed some light on a real solution if you think this is not the right one! Please let us know "how" to do it, if you think this is not the right way to do it!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 4 '18 at 4:25
It is a perfectly valid method of adding values to known_hosts, but yes it is susceptible to MITM. However, for internal use it is fine.
– Cameron Lowell Palmer
Nov 23 '18 at 14:15
It is a perfectly valid method of adding values to known_hosts, but yes it is susceptible to MITM. However, for internal use it is fine.
– Cameron Lowell Palmer
Nov 23 '18 at 14:15
|
show 1 more comment
this would be a complete solution, accepting host key for the first time only
#!/usr/bin/env ansible-playbook
---
- name: accept ssh fingerprint automatically for the first time
hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: False
tasks:
- name: "check if known_hosts contains server's fingerprint"
command: ssh-keygen -F inventory_hostname
register: keygen
failed_when: keygen.stderr != ''
changed_when: False
- name: fetch remote ssh key
command: ssh-keyscan -T5 inventory_hostname
register: keyscan
failed_when: keyscan.rc != 0 or keyscan.stdout == ''
changed_when: False
when: keygen.rc == 1
- name: add ssh-key to local known_hosts
lineinfile:
name: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
create: yes
line: " item "
when: keygen.rc == 1
with_items: 'default([]) '
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
this would be a complete solution, accepting host key for the first time only
#!/usr/bin/env ansible-playbook
---
- name: accept ssh fingerprint automatically for the first time
hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: False
tasks:
- name: "check if known_hosts contains server's fingerprint"
command: ssh-keygen -F inventory_hostname
register: keygen
failed_when: keygen.stderr != ''
changed_when: False
- name: fetch remote ssh key
command: ssh-keyscan -T5 inventory_hostname
register: keyscan
failed_when: keyscan.rc != 0 or keyscan.stdout == ''
changed_when: False
when: keygen.rc == 1
- name: add ssh-key to local known_hosts
lineinfile:
name: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
create: yes
line: " item "
when: keygen.rc == 1
with_items: 'default([]) '
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
this would be a complete solution, accepting host key for the first time only
#!/usr/bin/env ansible-playbook
---
- name: accept ssh fingerprint automatically for the first time
hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: False
tasks:
- name: "check if known_hosts contains server's fingerprint"
command: ssh-keygen -F inventory_hostname
register: keygen
failed_when: keygen.stderr != ''
changed_when: False
- name: fetch remote ssh key
command: ssh-keyscan -T5 inventory_hostname
register: keyscan
failed_when: keyscan.rc != 0 or keyscan.stdout == ''
changed_when: False
when: keygen.rc == 1
- name: add ssh-key to local known_hosts
lineinfile:
name: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
create: yes
line: " item "
when: keygen.rc == 1
with_items: 'default([]) '
this would be a complete solution, accepting host key for the first time only
#!/usr/bin/env ansible-playbook
---
- name: accept ssh fingerprint automatically for the first time
hosts: all
connection: local
gather_facts: False
tasks:
- name: "check if known_hosts contains server's fingerprint"
command: ssh-keygen -F inventory_hostname
register: keygen
failed_when: keygen.stderr != ''
changed_when: False
- name: fetch remote ssh key
command: ssh-keyscan -T5 inventory_hostname
register: keyscan
failed_when: keyscan.rc != 0 or keyscan.stdout == ''
changed_when: False
when: keygen.rc == 1
- name: add ssh-key to local known_hosts
lineinfile:
name: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
create: yes
line: " item "
when: keygen.rc == 1
with_items: 'default([]) '
edited Nov 23 '16 at 15:06
answered Nov 23 '16 at 13:51
mazacmazac
6113
6113
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
I had a similar issue and found that some of the provided answers only got me part way to an automated solution. The following is what I ended up using, hope it helps:
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o PasswordAuthentication=no 10.x.x.x
It adds the key to known_hosts
and doesn't prompt for the password.
1
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:23
3
Nobody checks the fingerprint.
– Brendan Byrd
Jun 2 '17 at 3:11
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
I had a similar issue and found that some of the provided answers only got me part way to an automated solution. The following is what I ended up using, hope it helps:
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o PasswordAuthentication=no 10.x.x.x
It adds the key to known_hosts
and doesn't prompt for the password.
1
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:23
3
Nobody checks the fingerprint.
– Brendan Byrd
Jun 2 '17 at 3:11
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
I had a similar issue and found that some of the provided answers only got me part way to an automated solution. The following is what I ended up using, hope it helps:
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o PasswordAuthentication=no 10.x.x.x
It adds the key to known_hosts
and doesn't prompt for the password.
I had a similar issue and found that some of the provided answers only got me part way to an automated solution. The following is what I ended up using, hope it helps:
ssh -o "StrictHostKeyChecking no" -o PasswordAuthentication=no 10.x.x.x
It adds the key to known_hosts
and doesn't prompt for the password.
answered Oct 21 '14 at 17:27
VenomFangsVenomFangs
234249
234249
1
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:23
3
Nobody checks the fingerprint.
– Brendan Byrd
Jun 2 '17 at 3:11
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
1
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:23
3
Nobody checks the fingerprint.
– Brendan Byrd
Jun 2 '17 at 3:11
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
1
1
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:23
Vulnerable to MITM attacks. You're not checking the fingerprint.
– Mnebuerquo
Jun 15 '16 at 17:23
3
3
Nobody checks the fingerprint.
– Brendan Byrd
Jun 2 '17 at 3:11
Nobody checks the fingerprint.
– Brendan Byrd
Jun 2 '17 at 3:11
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:40
add a comment |
So, I was searching for a mundane way to bypass the unkown host manual interaction of cloning a git repo as shown below:
brad@computer:~$ git clone git@bitbucket.org:viperks/viperks-api.git
Cloning into 'viperks-api'...
The authenticity of host 'bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Note the RSA key fingerprint...
So, this is a SSH thing, this will work for git over SSH and just SSH related things in general...
brad@computer:~$ nmap bitbucket.org --script ssh-hostkey
Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-10-05 10:21 EDT
Nmap scan report for bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)
Host is up (0.032s latency).
Other addresses for bitbucket.org (not scanned): 104.192.143.2 104.192.143.1 2401:1d80:1010::150
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
| ssh-hostkey:
| 1024 35:ee:d7:b8:ef:d7:79:e2:c6:43:9e:ab:40:6f:50:74 (DSA)
|_ 2048 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40 (RSA)
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 42.42 seconds
First, install nmap on your daily driver. nmap is highly helpful for certain things, like detecting open ports and this-- manually verifying SSH fingerprints. But, back to what we are doing.
Good. I'm either compromised at the multiple places and machines I've checked it-- or the more plausible explanation of everything being hunky dory is what is happening.
That 'fingerprint' is just a string shortened with a one way algorithm for our human convenience at the risk of more than one string resolving into the same fingerprint. It happens, they are called collisions.
Regardless, back to the original string which we can see in context below.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
no hostkey alg
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-129
bitbucket.org ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-123
no hostkey alg
So, ahead of time, we have a way of asking for a form of identification from the original host.
At this point we manually are as vulnerable as automatically-- the strings match, we have the base data that creates the fingerprint, and we could ask for that base data (preventing collisions) in the future.
Now to use that string in a way that prevents asking about a hosts authenticity...
The known_hosts file in this case does not use plaintext entries. You'll know hashed entries when you see them, they look like hashes with random characters instead of xyz.com or 123.45.67.89.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa -H bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
The first comment line infuriatingly shows up-- but you can get rid of it with a simple redirect via the ">" or ">>" convention.
As I've done my best to obtain untainted data to be used to identify a "host" and trust, I will add this identification to my known_hosts file in my ~/.ssh directory. Since it will now be identified as a known host, I will not get the prompt mentioned above when you were a youngster.
Thanks for sticking with me, here you go. I'm adding the bitbucket RSA key so that I can interact with my git repositories there in a non-interactive way as part of a CI workflow, but whatever you do what you want.
#!/bin/bash
cp ~/.ssh/known_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts.old && echo "|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==" >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
So, that's how you stay a virgin for today. You can do the same with github by following similar directions on your own time.
I saw so many stack overflow posts telling you to programmatically add the key blindly without any kind of checking. The more you check the key from different machines on different networks, the more trust you can have that the host is the one it says it is-- and that is the best you can hope from this layer of security.
WRONGssh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no hostname [command]
WRONGssh-keyscan -t rsa -H hostname >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Don't do either of the above things, please. You're given the opportunity to increase your chances of avoiding someone eavesdropping on your data transfers via a man in the middle attack-- take that opportunity. The difference is literally verifying that the RSA key you have is the one of the bona fide server and now you know how to get that information to compare them so you can trust the connection. Just remember more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection.
I think this is the best solution to this problem. However, be very careful while using Nmap on something like Amazon EC2, I got a warning about the port scanning that Nmap does! Fill in their form before doing portscanning!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 5 '18 at 4:37
...well, yeah. I don't know why you would do the port scanning from EC2. If you are logged in to your account, you can just get the keys from the actual machines. This is more for machines you don't have control over. I would assume you would have a local machine not subject to AWS port scanning restrictions to use. But, if you are in that edge case situation where you must run nmap with AWS, I suppose this warning would be helpful.
– BradChesney79
Jan 15 '18 at 19:51
Using nmap to read the SSH host key from your workstation and then trusting that value is no different than connecting via SSH with StructHostKeyChecking turned off. Its just as vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
– Micah R Ledbetter
Feb 7 '18 at 17:40
...@MicahRLedbetter which is why I suggested that "more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection". But, that is my point. If you only ever check your target host from one set of environment conditions then how would you ever know of any discrepancies? Did you have any better suggestions?
– BradChesney79
Feb 7 '18 at 19:06
This is security theater. Doing something complicated to create the appearance of greater security. It doesn't matter how many different methods you use to ask the host for its key. Like asking the same person multiple times if you can trust them (maybe you call, email, text, and snail mail) . They'll always say yes, but if you're asking the wrong person, it doesn't matter.
– vastlysuperiorman
Jun 26 '18 at 17:28
|
show 1 more comment
So, I was searching for a mundane way to bypass the unkown host manual interaction of cloning a git repo as shown below:
brad@computer:~$ git clone git@bitbucket.org:viperks/viperks-api.git
Cloning into 'viperks-api'...
The authenticity of host 'bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Note the RSA key fingerprint...
So, this is a SSH thing, this will work for git over SSH and just SSH related things in general...
brad@computer:~$ nmap bitbucket.org --script ssh-hostkey
Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-10-05 10:21 EDT
Nmap scan report for bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)
Host is up (0.032s latency).
Other addresses for bitbucket.org (not scanned): 104.192.143.2 104.192.143.1 2401:1d80:1010::150
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
| ssh-hostkey:
| 1024 35:ee:d7:b8:ef:d7:79:e2:c6:43:9e:ab:40:6f:50:74 (DSA)
|_ 2048 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40 (RSA)
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 42.42 seconds
First, install nmap on your daily driver. nmap is highly helpful for certain things, like detecting open ports and this-- manually verifying SSH fingerprints. But, back to what we are doing.
Good. I'm either compromised at the multiple places and machines I've checked it-- or the more plausible explanation of everything being hunky dory is what is happening.
That 'fingerprint' is just a string shortened with a one way algorithm for our human convenience at the risk of more than one string resolving into the same fingerprint. It happens, they are called collisions.
Regardless, back to the original string which we can see in context below.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
no hostkey alg
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-129
bitbucket.org ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-123
no hostkey alg
So, ahead of time, we have a way of asking for a form of identification from the original host.
At this point we manually are as vulnerable as automatically-- the strings match, we have the base data that creates the fingerprint, and we could ask for that base data (preventing collisions) in the future.
Now to use that string in a way that prevents asking about a hosts authenticity...
The known_hosts file in this case does not use plaintext entries. You'll know hashed entries when you see them, they look like hashes with random characters instead of xyz.com or 123.45.67.89.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa -H bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
The first comment line infuriatingly shows up-- but you can get rid of it with a simple redirect via the ">" or ">>" convention.
As I've done my best to obtain untainted data to be used to identify a "host" and trust, I will add this identification to my known_hosts file in my ~/.ssh directory. Since it will now be identified as a known host, I will not get the prompt mentioned above when you were a youngster.
Thanks for sticking with me, here you go. I'm adding the bitbucket RSA key so that I can interact with my git repositories there in a non-interactive way as part of a CI workflow, but whatever you do what you want.
#!/bin/bash
cp ~/.ssh/known_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts.old && echo "|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==" >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
So, that's how you stay a virgin for today. You can do the same with github by following similar directions on your own time.
I saw so many stack overflow posts telling you to programmatically add the key blindly without any kind of checking. The more you check the key from different machines on different networks, the more trust you can have that the host is the one it says it is-- and that is the best you can hope from this layer of security.
WRONGssh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no hostname [command]
WRONGssh-keyscan -t rsa -H hostname >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Don't do either of the above things, please. You're given the opportunity to increase your chances of avoiding someone eavesdropping on your data transfers via a man in the middle attack-- take that opportunity. The difference is literally verifying that the RSA key you have is the one of the bona fide server and now you know how to get that information to compare them so you can trust the connection. Just remember more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection.
I think this is the best solution to this problem. However, be very careful while using Nmap on something like Amazon EC2, I got a warning about the port scanning that Nmap does! Fill in their form before doing portscanning!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 5 '18 at 4:37
...well, yeah. I don't know why you would do the port scanning from EC2. If you are logged in to your account, you can just get the keys from the actual machines. This is more for machines you don't have control over. I would assume you would have a local machine not subject to AWS port scanning restrictions to use. But, if you are in that edge case situation where you must run nmap with AWS, I suppose this warning would be helpful.
– BradChesney79
Jan 15 '18 at 19:51
Using nmap to read the SSH host key from your workstation and then trusting that value is no different than connecting via SSH with StructHostKeyChecking turned off. Its just as vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
– Micah R Ledbetter
Feb 7 '18 at 17:40
...@MicahRLedbetter which is why I suggested that "more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection". But, that is my point. If you only ever check your target host from one set of environment conditions then how would you ever know of any discrepancies? Did you have any better suggestions?
– BradChesney79
Feb 7 '18 at 19:06
This is security theater. Doing something complicated to create the appearance of greater security. It doesn't matter how many different methods you use to ask the host for its key. Like asking the same person multiple times if you can trust them (maybe you call, email, text, and snail mail) . They'll always say yes, but if you're asking the wrong person, it doesn't matter.
– vastlysuperiorman
Jun 26 '18 at 17:28
|
show 1 more comment
So, I was searching for a mundane way to bypass the unkown host manual interaction of cloning a git repo as shown below:
brad@computer:~$ git clone git@bitbucket.org:viperks/viperks-api.git
Cloning into 'viperks-api'...
The authenticity of host 'bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Note the RSA key fingerprint...
So, this is a SSH thing, this will work for git over SSH and just SSH related things in general...
brad@computer:~$ nmap bitbucket.org --script ssh-hostkey
Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-10-05 10:21 EDT
Nmap scan report for bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)
Host is up (0.032s latency).
Other addresses for bitbucket.org (not scanned): 104.192.143.2 104.192.143.1 2401:1d80:1010::150
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
| ssh-hostkey:
| 1024 35:ee:d7:b8:ef:d7:79:e2:c6:43:9e:ab:40:6f:50:74 (DSA)
|_ 2048 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40 (RSA)
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 42.42 seconds
First, install nmap on your daily driver. nmap is highly helpful for certain things, like detecting open ports and this-- manually verifying SSH fingerprints. But, back to what we are doing.
Good. I'm either compromised at the multiple places and machines I've checked it-- or the more plausible explanation of everything being hunky dory is what is happening.
That 'fingerprint' is just a string shortened with a one way algorithm for our human convenience at the risk of more than one string resolving into the same fingerprint. It happens, they are called collisions.
Regardless, back to the original string which we can see in context below.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
no hostkey alg
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-129
bitbucket.org ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-123
no hostkey alg
So, ahead of time, we have a way of asking for a form of identification from the original host.
At this point we manually are as vulnerable as automatically-- the strings match, we have the base data that creates the fingerprint, and we could ask for that base data (preventing collisions) in the future.
Now to use that string in a way that prevents asking about a hosts authenticity...
The known_hosts file in this case does not use plaintext entries. You'll know hashed entries when you see them, they look like hashes with random characters instead of xyz.com or 123.45.67.89.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa -H bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
The first comment line infuriatingly shows up-- but you can get rid of it with a simple redirect via the ">" or ">>" convention.
As I've done my best to obtain untainted data to be used to identify a "host" and trust, I will add this identification to my known_hosts file in my ~/.ssh directory. Since it will now be identified as a known host, I will not get the prompt mentioned above when you were a youngster.
Thanks for sticking with me, here you go. I'm adding the bitbucket RSA key so that I can interact with my git repositories there in a non-interactive way as part of a CI workflow, but whatever you do what you want.
#!/bin/bash
cp ~/.ssh/known_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts.old && echo "|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==" >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
So, that's how you stay a virgin for today. You can do the same with github by following similar directions on your own time.
I saw so many stack overflow posts telling you to programmatically add the key blindly without any kind of checking. The more you check the key from different machines on different networks, the more trust you can have that the host is the one it says it is-- and that is the best you can hope from this layer of security.
WRONGssh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no hostname [command]
WRONGssh-keyscan -t rsa -H hostname >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Don't do either of the above things, please. You're given the opportunity to increase your chances of avoiding someone eavesdropping on your data transfers via a man in the middle attack-- take that opportunity. The difference is literally verifying that the RSA key you have is the one of the bona fide server and now you know how to get that information to compare them so you can trust the connection. Just remember more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection.
So, I was searching for a mundane way to bypass the unkown host manual interaction of cloning a git repo as shown below:
brad@computer:~$ git clone git@bitbucket.org:viperks/viperks-api.git
Cloning into 'viperks-api'...
The authenticity of host 'bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)' can't be established.
RSA key fingerprint is 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
Note the RSA key fingerprint...
So, this is a SSH thing, this will work for git over SSH and just SSH related things in general...
brad@computer:~$ nmap bitbucket.org --script ssh-hostkey
Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-10-05 10:21 EDT
Nmap scan report for bitbucket.org (104.192.143.3)
Host is up (0.032s latency).
Other addresses for bitbucket.org (not scanned): 104.192.143.2 104.192.143.1 2401:1d80:1010::150
Not shown: 997 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
| ssh-hostkey:
| 1024 35:ee:d7:b8:ef:d7:79:e2:c6:43:9e:ab:40:6f:50:74 (DSA)
|_ 2048 97:8c:1b:f2:6f:14:6b:5c:3b:ec:aa:46:46:74:7c:40 (RSA)
80/tcp open http
443/tcp open https
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 42.42 seconds
First, install nmap on your daily driver. nmap is highly helpful for certain things, like detecting open ports and this-- manually verifying SSH fingerprints. But, back to what we are doing.
Good. I'm either compromised at the multiple places and machines I've checked it-- or the more plausible explanation of everything being hunky dory is what is happening.
That 'fingerprint' is just a string shortened with a one way algorithm for our human convenience at the risk of more than one string resolving into the same fingerprint. It happens, they are called collisions.
Regardless, back to the original string which we can see in context below.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
no hostkey alg
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-129
bitbucket.org ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-123
no hostkey alg
So, ahead of time, we have a way of asking for a form of identification from the original host.
At this point we manually are as vulnerable as automatically-- the strings match, we have the base data that creates the fingerprint, and we could ask for that base data (preventing collisions) in the future.
Now to use that string in a way that prevents asking about a hosts authenticity...
The known_hosts file in this case does not use plaintext entries. You'll know hashed entries when you see them, they look like hashes with random characters instead of xyz.com or 123.45.67.89.
brad@computer:~$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa -H bitbucket.org
# bitbucket.org SSH-2.0-conker_1.0.257-ce87fba app-128
|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==
The first comment line infuriatingly shows up-- but you can get rid of it with a simple redirect via the ">" or ">>" convention.
As I've done my best to obtain untainted data to be used to identify a "host" and trust, I will add this identification to my known_hosts file in my ~/.ssh directory. Since it will now be identified as a known host, I will not get the prompt mentioned above when you were a youngster.
Thanks for sticking with me, here you go. I'm adding the bitbucket RSA key so that I can interact with my git repositories there in a non-interactive way as part of a CI workflow, but whatever you do what you want.
#!/bin/bash
cp ~/.ssh/known_hosts ~/.ssh/known_hosts.old && echo "|1|yr6p7i8doyLhDtrrnWDk7m9QVXk=|LuKNg9gypeDhfRo/AvLTAlxnyQw= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAubiN81eDcafrgMeLzaFPsw2kNvEcqTKl/VqLat/MaB33pZy0y3rJZtnqwR2qOOvbwKZYKiEO1O6VqNEBxKvJJelCq0dTXWT5pbO2gDXC6h6QDXCaHo6pOHGPUy+YBaGQRGuSusMEASYiWunYN0vCAI8QaXnWMXNMdFP3jHAJH0eDsoiGnLPBlBp4TNm6rYI74nMzgz3B9IikW4WVK+dc8KZJZWYjAuORU3jc1c/NPskD2ASinf8v3xnfXeukU0sJ5N6m5E8VLjObPEO+mN2t/FZTMZLiFqPWc/ALSqnMnnhwrNi2rbfg/rd/IpL8Le3pSBne8+seeFVBoGqzHM9yXw==" >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
So, that's how you stay a virgin for today. You can do the same with github by following similar directions on your own time.
I saw so many stack overflow posts telling you to programmatically add the key blindly without any kind of checking. The more you check the key from different machines on different networks, the more trust you can have that the host is the one it says it is-- and that is the best you can hope from this layer of security.
WRONGssh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no hostname [command]
WRONGssh-keyscan -t rsa -H hostname >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Don't do either of the above things, please. You're given the opportunity to increase your chances of avoiding someone eavesdropping on your data transfers via a man in the middle attack-- take that opportunity. The difference is literally verifying that the RSA key you have is the one of the bona fide server and now you know how to get that information to compare them so you can trust the connection. Just remember more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection.
answered Oct 5 '16 at 21:18
BradChesney79BradChesney79
21738
21738
I think this is the best solution to this problem. However, be very careful while using Nmap on something like Amazon EC2, I got a warning about the port scanning that Nmap does! Fill in their form before doing portscanning!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 5 '18 at 4:37
...well, yeah. I don't know why you would do the port scanning from EC2. If you are logged in to your account, you can just get the keys from the actual machines. This is more for machines you don't have control over. I would assume you would have a local machine not subject to AWS port scanning restrictions to use. But, if you are in that edge case situation where you must run nmap with AWS, I suppose this warning would be helpful.
– BradChesney79
Jan 15 '18 at 19:51
Using nmap to read the SSH host key from your workstation and then trusting that value is no different than connecting via SSH with StructHostKeyChecking turned off. Its just as vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
– Micah R Ledbetter
Feb 7 '18 at 17:40
...@MicahRLedbetter which is why I suggested that "more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection". But, that is my point. If you only ever check your target host from one set of environment conditions then how would you ever know of any discrepancies? Did you have any better suggestions?
– BradChesney79
Feb 7 '18 at 19:06
This is security theater. Doing something complicated to create the appearance of greater security. It doesn't matter how many different methods you use to ask the host for its key. Like asking the same person multiple times if you can trust them (maybe you call, email, text, and snail mail) . They'll always say yes, but if you're asking the wrong person, it doesn't matter.
– vastlysuperiorman
Jun 26 '18 at 17:28
|
show 1 more comment
I think this is the best solution to this problem. However, be very careful while using Nmap on something like Amazon EC2, I got a warning about the port scanning that Nmap does! Fill in their form before doing portscanning!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 5 '18 at 4:37
...well, yeah. I don't know why you would do the port scanning from EC2. If you are logged in to your account, you can just get the keys from the actual machines. This is more for machines you don't have control over. I would assume you would have a local machine not subject to AWS port scanning restrictions to use. But, if you are in that edge case situation where you must run nmap with AWS, I suppose this warning would be helpful.
– BradChesney79
Jan 15 '18 at 19:51
Using nmap to read the SSH host key from your workstation and then trusting that value is no different than connecting via SSH with StructHostKeyChecking turned off. Its just as vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
– Micah R Ledbetter
Feb 7 '18 at 17:40
...@MicahRLedbetter which is why I suggested that "more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection". But, that is my point. If you only ever check your target host from one set of environment conditions then how would you ever know of any discrepancies? Did you have any better suggestions?
– BradChesney79
Feb 7 '18 at 19:06
This is security theater. Doing something complicated to create the appearance of greater security. It doesn't matter how many different methods you use to ask the host for its key. Like asking the same person multiple times if you can trust them (maybe you call, email, text, and snail mail) . They'll always say yes, but if you're asking the wrong person, it doesn't matter.
– vastlysuperiorman
Jun 26 '18 at 17:28
I think this is the best solution to this problem. However, be very careful while using Nmap on something like Amazon EC2, I got a warning about the port scanning that Nmap does! Fill in their form before doing portscanning!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 5 '18 at 4:37
I think this is the best solution to this problem. However, be very careful while using Nmap on something like Amazon EC2, I got a warning about the port scanning that Nmap does! Fill in their form before doing portscanning!
– Waqas Shah
Jan 5 '18 at 4:37
...well, yeah. I don't know why you would do the port scanning from EC2. If you are logged in to your account, you can just get the keys from the actual machines. This is more for machines you don't have control over. I would assume you would have a local machine not subject to AWS port scanning restrictions to use. But, if you are in that edge case situation where you must run nmap with AWS, I suppose this warning would be helpful.
– BradChesney79
Jan 15 '18 at 19:51
...well, yeah. I don't know why you would do the port scanning from EC2. If you are logged in to your account, you can just get the keys from the actual machines. This is more for machines you don't have control over. I would assume you would have a local machine not subject to AWS port scanning restrictions to use. But, if you are in that edge case situation where you must run nmap with AWS, I suppose this warning would be helpful.
– BradChesney79
Jan 15 '18 at 19:51
Using nmap to read the SSH host key from your workstation and then trusting that value is no different than connecting via SSH with StructHostKeyChecking turned off. Its just as vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
– Micah R Ledbetter
Feb 7 '18 at 17:40
Using nmap to read the SSH host key from your workstation and then trusting that value is no different than connecting via SSH with StructHostKeyChecking turned off. Its just as vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
– Micah R Ledbetter
Feb 7 '18 at 17:40
...@MicahRLedbetter which is why I suggested that "more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection". But, that is my point. If you only ever check your target host from one set of environment conditions then how would you ever know of any discrepancies? Did you have any better suggestions?
– BradChesney79
Feb 7 '18 at 19:06
...@MicahRLedbetter which is why I suggested that "more comparisons from different computers & networks will usually increase your ability to trust the connection". But, that is my point. If you only ever check your target host from one set of environment conditions then how would you ever know of any discrepancies? Did you have any better suggestions?
– BradChesney79
Feb 7 '18 at 19:06
This is security theater. Doing something complicated to create the appearance of greater security. It doesn't matter how many different methods you use to ask the host for its key. Like asking the same person multiple times if you can trust them (maybe you call, email, text, and snail mail) . They'll always say yes, but if you're asking the wrong person, it doesn't matter.
– vastlysuperiorman
Jun 26 '18 at 17:28
This is security theater. Doing something complicated to create the appearance of greater security. It doesn't matter how many different methods you use to ask the host for its key. Like asking the same person multiple times if you can trust them (maybe you call, email, text, and snail mail) . They'll always say yes, but if you're asking the wrong person, it doesn't matter.
– vastlysuperiorman
Jun 26 '18 at 17:28
|
show 1 more comment
I do a one-liner script, a bit long but useful to make this task for hosts with multiples IPs, using dig
and bash
(host=github.com; ssh-keyscan -H $host; for ip in $(dig @8.8.8.8 github.com +short); do ssh-keyscan -H $host,$ip; ssh-keyscan -H $ip; done) 2> /dev/null >> .ssh/known_hosts
add a comment |
I do a one-liner script, a bit long but useful to make this task for hosts with multiples IPs, using dig
and bash
(host=github.com; ssh-keyscan -H $host; for ip in $(dig @8.8.8.8 github.com +short); do ssh-keyscan -H $host,$ip; ssh-keyscan -H $ip; done) 2> /dev/null >> .ssh/known_hosts
add a comment |
I do a one-liner script, a bit long but useful to make this task for hosts with multiples IPs, using dig
and bash
(host=github.com; ssh-keyscan -H $host; for ip in $(dig @8.8.8.8 github.com +short); do ssh-keyscan -H $host,$ip; ssh-keyscan -H $ip; done) 2> /dev/null >> .ssh/known_hosts
I do a one-liner script, a bit long but useful to make this task for hosts with multiples IPs, using dig
and bash
(host=github.com; ssh-keyscan -H $host; for ip in $(dig @8.8.8.8 github.com +short); do ssh-keyscan -H $host,$ip; ssh-keyscan -H $ip; done) 2> /dev/null >> .ssh/known_hosts
answered Apr 18 '17 at 21:01
Felipe AlcacibarFelipe Alcacibar
15616
15616
add a comment |
add a comment |
The following avoid duplicate entries in ~/.ssh/known_hosts:
if ! grep "$(ssh-keyscan github.com 2>/dev/null)" ~/.ssh/known_hosts > /dev/null; then
ssh-keyscan github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
fi
1
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:42
I like this answer best. For scripting initial setup of a random VPS of no importance to anyone but me, MITM risk is vanishingly small. Infinitesimal quibble ... first line needs to bemkdir -p ~/.ssh/known_hosts;
– Martin Bramwell
Mar 5 at 23:00
add a comment |
The following avoid duplicate entries in ~/.ssh/known_hosts:
if ! grep "$(ssh-keyscan github.com 2>/dev/null)" ~/.ssh/known_hosts > /dev/null; then
ssh-keyscan github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
fi
1
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:42
I like this answer best. For scripting initial setup of a random VPS of no importance to anyone but me, MITM risk is vanishingly small. Infinitesimal quibble ... first line needs to bemkdir -p ~/.ssh/known_hosts;
– Martin Bramwell
Mar 5 at 23:00
add a comment |
The following avoid duplicate entries in ~/.ssh/known_hosts:
if ! grep "$(ssh-keyscan github.com 2>/dev/null)" ~/.ssh/known_hosts > /dev/null; then
ssh-keyscan github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
fi
The following avoid duplicate entries in ~/.ssh/known_hosts:
if ! grep "$(ssh-keyscan github.com 2>/dev/null)" ~/.ssh/known_hosts > /dev/null; then
ssh-keyscan github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
fi
answered Jul 2 '17 at 11:41
Amadu BahAmadu Bah
1813
1813
1
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:42
I like this answer best. For scripting initial setup of a random VPS of no importance to anyone but me, MITM risk is vanishingly small. Infinitesimal quibble ... first line needs to bemkdir -p ~/.ssh/known_hosts;
– Martin Bramwell
Mar 5 at 23:00
add a comment |
1
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:42
I like this answer best. For scripting initial setup of a random VPS of no importance to anyone but me, MITM risk is vanishingly small. Infinitesimal quibble ... first line needs to bemkdir -p ~/.ssh/known_hosts;
– Martin Bramwell
Mar 5 at 23:00
1
1
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:42
This is not the way to do it. MITM.
– jameshfisher
Nov 28 '17 at 16:42
I like this answer best. For scripting initial setup of a random VPS of no importance to anyone but me, MITM risk is vanishingly small. Infinitesimal quibble ... first line needs to be
mkdir -p ~/.ssh/known_hosts;
– Martin Bramwell
Mar 5 at 23:00
I like this answer best. For scripting initial setup of a random VPS of no importance to anyone but me, MITM risk is vanishingly small. Infinitesimal quibble ... first line needs to be
mkdir -p ~/.ssh/known_hosts;
– Martin Bramwell
Mar 5 at 23:00
add a comment |
To do this properly, what you really want to do is collect the host public keys of the VMs as you create them and drop them into a file in known_hosts
format. You can then use the -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=...
, pointing to that file, to ensure that you're connecting to the host you believe you should be connecting to. How you do this depends on how you're setting up the virtual machines, however, but reading it off the virtual filesystem, if possible, or even getting the host to print the contents of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
during configuration may do the trick.
That said, this may not be worthwhile, depending on what sort of environment you're working in and who your anticipated adversaries are. Doing a simple "store on first connect" (via a scan or simply during the first "real" connection) as described in several other answers above may be considerably easier and still provide some modicum of security. However, if you do this I strongly suggest you change the user known hosts file (-o UserKnownHostsFile=...
) to a file specific
for this particular test installation; this will avoid polluting your personal known hosts file with test information and make it easy to clean up the now useless public keys when you delete your VMs.
add a comment |
To do this properly, what you really want to do is collect the host public keys of the VMs as you create them and drop them into a file in known_hosts
format. You can then use the -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=...
, pointing to that file, to ensure that you're connecting to the host you believe you should be connecting to. How you do this depends on how you're setting up the virtual machines, however, but reading it off the virtual filesystem, if possible, or even getting the host to print the contents of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
during configuration may do the trick.
That said, this may not be worthwhile, depending on what sort of environment you're working in and who your anticipated adversaries are. Doing a simple "store on first connect" (via a scan or simply during the first "real" connection) as described in several other answers above may be considerably easier and still provide some modicum of security. However, if you do this I strongly suggest you change the user known hosts file (-o UserKnownHostsFile=...
) to a file specific
for this particular test installation; this will avoid polluting your personal known hosts file with test information and make it easy to clean up the now useless public keys when you delete your VMs.
add a comment |
To do this properly, what you really want to do is collect the host public keys of the VMs as you create them and drop them into a file in known_hosts
format. You can then use the -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=...
, pointing to that file, to ensure that you're connecting to the host you believe you should be connecting to. How you do this depends on how you're setting up the virtual machines, however, but reading it off the virtual filesystem, if possible, or even getting the host to print the contents of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
during configuration may do the trick.
That said, this may not be worthwhile, depending on what sort of environment you're working in and who your anticipated adversaries are. Doing a simple "store on first connect" (via a scan or simply during the first "real" connection) as described in several other answers above may be considerably easier and still provide some modicum of security. However, if you do this I strongly suggest you change the user known hosts file (-o UserKnownHostsFile=...
) to a file specific
for this particular test installation; this will avoid polluting your personal known hosts file with test information and make it easy to clean up the now useless public keys when you delete your VMs.
To do this properly, what you really want to do is collect the host public keys of the VMs as you create them and drop them into a file in known_hosts
format. You can then use the -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=...
, pointing to that file, to ensure that you're connecting to the host you believe you should be connecting to. How you do this depends on how you're setting up the virtual machines, however, but reading it off the virtual filesystem, if possible, or even getting the host to print the contents of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
during configuration may do the trick.
That said, this may not be worthwhile, depending on what sort of environment you're working in and who your anticipated adversaries are. Doing a simple "store on first connect" (via a scan or simply during the first "real" connection) as described in several other answers above may be considerably easier and still provide some modicum of security. However, if you do this I strongly suggest you change the user known hosts file (-o UserKnownHostsFile=...
) to a file specific
for this particular test installation; this will avoid polluting your personal known hosts file with test information and make it easy to clean up the now useless public keys when you delete your VMs.
answered Dec 12 '16 at 2:27
Curt J. SampsonCurt J. Sampson
8411821
8411821
add a comment |
add a comment |
This whole
- ssh-key-scan
- ssh-copy-id
- ECSDA key warning
business kept annoying me so I opted for
One script to rule them all
This is a variant of the script at https://askubuntu.com/a/949731/129227 with Amadu Bah's answer https://serverfault.com/a/858957/162693 in a loop.
example call
./sshcheck somedomain site1 site2 site3
The script will loop over the names sites and modify the .ssh/config and .ssh/known_hosts file and do ssh-copy-id on request - for the last feature just the let the ssh test calls fail e.g. by hitting enter 3 times on the password request.
sshcheck script
#!/bin/bash
# WF 2017-08-25
# check ssh access to bitplan servers
#ansi colors
#http://www.csc.uvic.ca/~sae/seng265/fall04/tips/s265s047-tips/bash-using-colors.html
blue='33[0;34m'
red='33[0;31m'
green='33[0;32m' # 'e[1;32m' is too bright for white bg.
endColor='33[0m'
#
# a colored message
# params:
# 1: l_color - the color of the message
# 2: l_msg - the message to display
#
color_msg()
local l_color="$1"
local l_msg="$2"
echo -e "$l_color$l_msg$endColor"
#
# error
#
# show an error message and exit
#
# params:
# 1: l_msg - the message to display
error()
local l_msg="$1"
# use ansi red for error
color_msg $red "Error: $l_msg" 1>&2
exit 1
#
# show the usage
#
usage()
echo "usage: $0 domain sites"
exit 1
#
# check known_hosts entry for server
#
checkknown()
local l_server="$1"
#echo $l_server
local l_sid="$(ssh-keyscan $l_server 2>/dev/null)"
#echo $l_sid
if (! grep "$l_sid" $sknown) > /dev/null
then
color_msg $blue "adding $l_server to $sknown"
ssh-keyscan $l_server >> $sknown 2>&1
fi
#
# check the given server
#
checkserver() yes) ssh-copy-id $l_server
esac
fi
#
# check all servers
#
checkservers()
me=$(hostname -f)
for server in $(echo $*
#
# check configuration
#
checkconfig()
#https://askubuntu.com/questions/87449/how-to-disable-strict-host-key-checking-in-ssh
if [ -f $sconfig ]
then
color_msg $green "$sconfig exists"
ls -l $sconfig
fi
sconfig=~/.ssh/config
sknown=~/.ssh/known_hosts
case $# in
0) usage ;;
1) usage ;;
*)
domain=$1
shift
color_msg $blue "checking ssh configuration for domain $domain sites $*"
checkconfig
checkservers $*
#for server in $(echo $* | sort)
##do
# checkknown $server
#done
;;
esac
add a comment |
This whole
- ssh-key-scan
- ssh-copy-id
- ECSDA key warning
business kept annoying me so I opted for
One script to rule them all
This is a variant of the script at https://askubuntu.com/a/949731/129227 with Amadu Bah's answer https://serverfault.com/a/858957/162693 in a loop.
example call
./sshcheck somedomain site1 site2 site3
The script will loop over the names sites and modify the .ssh/config and .ssh/known_hosts file and do ssh-copy-id on request - for the last feature just the let the ssh test calls fail e.g. by hitting enter 3 times on the password request.
sshcheck script
#!/bin/bash
# WF 2017-08-25
# check ssh access to bitplan servers
#ansi colors
#http://www.csc.uvic.ca/~sae/seng265/fall04/tips/s265s047-tips/bash-using-colors.html
blue='33[0;34m'
red='33[0;31m'
green='33[0;32m' # 'e[1;32m' is too bright for white bg.
endColor='33[0m'
#
# a colored message
# params:
# 1: l_color - the color of the message
# 2: l_msg - the message to display
#
color_msg()
local l_color="$1"
local l_msg="$2"
echo -e "$l_color$l_msg$endColor"
#
# error
#
# show an error message and exit
#
# params:
# 1: l_msg - the message to display
error()
local l_msg="$1"
# use ansi red for error
color_msg $red "Error: $l_msg" 1>&2
exit 1
#
# show the usage
#
usage()
echo "usage: $0 domain sites"
exit 1
#
# check known_hosts entry for server
#
checkknown()
local l_server="$1"
#echo $l_server
local l_sid="$(ssh-keyscan $l_server 2>/dev/null)"
#echo $l_sid
if (! grep "$l_sid" $sknown) > /dev/null
then
color_msg $blue "adding $l_server to $sknown"
ssh-keyscan $l_server >> $sknown 2>&1
fi
#
# check the given server
#
checkserver() yes) ssh-copy-id $l_server
esac
fi
#
# check all servers
#
checkservers()
me=$(hostname -f)
for server in $(echo $*
#
# check configuration
#
checkconfig()
#https://askubuntu.com/questions/87449/how-to-disable-strict-host-key-checking-in-ssh
if [ -f $sconfig ]
then
color_msg $green "$sconfig exists"
ls -l $sconfig
fi
sconfig=~/.ssh/config
sknown=~/.ssh/known_hosts
case $# in
0) usage ;;
1) usage ;;
*)
domain=$1
shift
color_msg $blue "checking ssh configuration for domain $domain sites $*"
checkconfig
checkservers $*
#for server in $(echo $* | sort)
##do
# checkknown $server
#done
;;
esac
add a comment |
This whole
- ssh-key-scan
- ssh-copy-id
- ECSDA key warning
business kept annoying me so I opted for
One script to rule them all
This is a variant of the script at https://askubuntu.com/a/949731/129227 with Amadu Bah's answer https://serverfault.com/a/858957/162693 in a loop.
example call
./sshcheck somedomain site1 site2 site3
The script will loop over the names sites and modify the .ssh/config and .ssh/known_hosts file and do ssh-copy-id on request - for the last feature just the let the ssh test calls fail e.g. by hitting enter 3 times on the password request.
sshcheck script
#!/bin/bash
# WF 2017-08-25
# check ssh access to bitplan servers
#ansi colors
#http://www.csc.uvic.ca/~sae/seng265/fall04/tips/s265s047-tips/bash-using-colors.html
blue='33[0;34m'
red='33[0;31m'
green='33[0;32m' # 'e[1;32m' is too bright for white bg.
endColor='33[0m'
#
# a colored message
# params:
# 1: l_color - the color of the message
# 2: l_msg - the message to display
#
color_msg()
local l_color="$1"
local l_msg="$2"
echo -e "$l_color$l_msg$endColor"
#
# error
#
# show an error message and exit
#
# params:
# 1: l_msg - the message to display
error()
local l_msg="$1"
# use ansi red for error
color_msg $red "Error: $l_msg" 1>&2
exit 1
#
# show the usage
#
usage()
echo "usage: $0 domain sites"
exit 1
#
# check known_hosts entry for server
#
checkknown()
local l_server="$1"
#echo $l_server
local l_sid="$(ssh-keyscan $l_server 2>/dev/null)"
#echo $l_sid
if (! grep "$l_sid" $sknown) > /dev/null
then
color_msg $blue "adding $l_server to $sknown"
ssh-keyscan $l_server >> $sknown 2>&1
fi
#
# check the given server
#
checkserver() yes) ssh-copy-id $l_server
esac
fi
#
# check all servers
#
checkservers()
me=$(hostname -f)
for server in $(echo $*
#
# check configuration
#
checkconfig()
#https://askubuntu.com/questions/87449/how-to-disable-strict-host-key-checking-in-ssh
if [ -f $sconfig ]
then
color_msg $green "$sconfig exists"
ls -l $sconfig
fi
sconfig=~/.ssh/config
sknown=~/.ssh/known_hosts
case $# in
0) usage ;;
1) usage ;;
*)
domain=$1
shift
color_msg $blue "checking ssh configuration for domain $domain sites $*"
checkconfig
checkservers $*
#for server in $(echo $* | sort)
##do
# checkknown $server
#done
;;
esac
This whole
- ssh-key-scan
- ssh-copy-id
- ECSDA key warning
business kept annoying me so I opted for
One script to rule them all
This is a variant of the script at https://askubuntu.com/a/949731/129227 with Amadu Bah's answer https://serverfault.com/a/858957/162693 in a loop.
example call
./sshcheck somedomain site1 site2 site3
The script will loop over the names sites and modify the .ssh/config and .ssh/known_hosts file and do ssh-copy-id on request - for the last feature just the let the ssh test calls fail e.g. by hitting enter 3 times on the password request.
sshcheck script
#!/bin/bash
# WF 2017-08-25
# check ssh access to bitplan servers
#ansi colors
#http://www.csc.uvic.ca/~sae/seng265/fall04/tips/s265s047-tips/bash-using-colors.html
blue='33[0;34m'
red='33[0;31m'
green='33[0;32m' # 'e[1;32m' is too bright for white bg.
endColor='33[0m'
#
# a colored message
# params:
# 1: l_color - the color of the message
# 2: l_msg - the message to display
#
color_msg()
local l_color="$1"
local l_msg="$2"
echo -e "$l_color$l_msg$endColor"
#
# error
#
# show an error message and exit
#
# params:
# 1: l_msg - the message to display
error()
local l_msg="$1"
# use ansi red for error
color_msg $red "Error: $l_msg" 1>&2
exit 1
#
# show the usage
#
usage()
echo "usage: $0 domain sites"
exit 1
#
# check known_hosts entry for server
#
checkknown()
local l_server="$1"
#echo $l_server
local l_sid="$(ssh-keyscan $l_server 2>/dev/null)"
#echo $l_sid
if (! grep "$l_sid" $sknown) > /dev/null
then
color_msg $blue "adding $l_server to $sknown"
ssh-keyscan $l_server >> $sknown 2>&1
fi
#
# check the given server
#
checkserver() yes) ssh-copy-id $l_server
esac
fi
#
# check all servers
#
checkservers()
me=$(hostname -f)
for server in $(echo $*
#
# check configuration
#
checkconfig()
#https://askubuntu.com/questions/87449/how-to-disable-strict-host-key-checking-in-ssh
if [ -f $sconfig ]
then
color_msg $green "$sconfig exists"
ls -l $sconfig
fi
sconfig=~/.ssh/config
sknown=~/.ssh/known_hosts
case $# in
0) usage ;;
1) usage ;;
*)
domain=$1
shift
color_msg $blue "checking ssh configuration for domain $domain sites $*"
checkconfig
checkservers $*
#for server in $(echo $* | sort)
##do
# checkknown $server
#done
;;
esac
edited Aug 25 '17 at 15:39
answered Aug 25 '17 at 13:16
Wolfgang FahlWolfgang Fahl
2721311
2721311
add a comment |
add a comment |
How are you building these machines? can you run a dns update script? can you join an IPA Domain?
FreeIPA does this automatically, but essentially all you need is SSHFP dns records and DNSSEC on your zone (freeipa provides as configurable options (dnssec disabled by default)).
You can get the existing SSHFP records from your host by running.
ssh-keygen -r jersey.jacobdevans.com
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 1 4d8589de6b1a48e148d8fc9fbb967f1b29f53ebc jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 2 6503272a11ba6d7fec2518c02dfed88f3d455ac7786ee5dbd72df63307209d55
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 1 5a7a1e8ab8f25b86b63c377b303659289b895736 > jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 2 1f50f790117dfedd329dbcf622a7d47551e12ff5913902c66a7da28e47de4f4b
then once published, you'd add VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
to your ssh_config or ~/.ssh/config
If/When google decides to flip on DNSSEC, you could ssh in without a hostkey prompt.
ssh jersey.jacobdevans.com
BUT my domain is not signed yet, so for now you'd see....
debug1: Server host key: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s
debug1: found 4 insecure fingerprints in DNS
debug1: matching host key fingerprint
found in DNS The authenticity of host 'jersey.jacobdevans.com (2605:6400:10:434::10)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is
SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s. Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? no
add a comment |
How are you building these machines? can you run a dns update script? can you join an IPA Domain?
FreeIPA does this automatically, but essentially all you need is SSHFP dns records and DNSSEC on your zone (freeipa provides as configurable options (dnssec disabled by default)).
You can get the existing SSHFP records from your host by running.
ssh-keygen -r jersey.jacobdevans.com
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 1 4d8589de6b1a48e148d8fc9fbb967f1b29f53ebc jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 2 6503272a11ba6d7fec2518c02dfed88f3d455ac7786ee5dbd72df63307209d55
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 1 5a7a1e8ab8f25b86b63c377b303659289b895736 > jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 2 1f50f790117dfedd329dbcf622a7d47551e12ff5913902c66a7da28e47de4f4b
then once published, you'd add VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
to your ssh_config or ~/.ssh/config
If/When google decides to flip on DNSSEC, you could ssh in without a hostkey prompt.
ssh jersey.jacobdevans.com
BUT my domain is not signed yet, so for now you'd see....
debug1: Server host key: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s
debug1: found 4 insecure fingerprints in DNS
debug1: matching host key fingerprint
found in DNS The authenticity of host 'jersey.jacobdevans.com (2605:6400:10:434::10)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is
SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s. Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? no
add a comment |
How are you building these machines? can you run a dns update script? can you join an IPA Domain?
FreeIPA does this automatically, but essentially all you need is SSHFP dns records and DNSSEC on your zone (freeipa provides as configurable options (dnssec disabled by default)).
You can get the existing SSHFP records from your host by running.
ssh-keygen -r jersey.jacobdevans.com
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 1 4d8589de6b1a48e148d8fc9fbb967f1b29f53ebc jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 2 6503272a11ba6d7fec2518c02dfed88f3d455ac7786ee5dbd72df63307209d55
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 1 5a7a1e8ab8f25b86b63c377b303659289b895736 > jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 2 1f50f790117dfedd329dbcf622a7d47551e12ff5913902c66a7da28e47de4f4b
then once published, you'd add VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
to your ssh_config or ~/.ssh/config
If/When google decides to flip on DNSSEC, you could ssh in without a hostkey prompt.
ssh jersey.jacobdevans.com
BUT my domain is not signed yet, so for now you'd see....
debug1: Server host key: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s
debug1: found 4 insecure fingerprints in DNS
debug1: matching host key fingerprint
found in DNS The authenticity of host 'jersey.jacobdevans.com (2605:6400:10:434::10)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is
SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s. Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? no
How are you building these machines? can you run a dns update script? can you join an IPA Domain?
FreeIPA does this automatically, but essentially all you need is SSHFP dns records and DNSSEC on your zone (freeipa provides as configurable options (dnssec disabled by default)).
You can get the existing SSHFP records from your host by running.
ssh-keygen -r jersey.jacobdevans.com
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 1 4d8589de6b1a48e148d8fc9fbb967f1b29f53ebc jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 1 2 6503272a11ba6d7fec2518c02dfed88f3d455ac7786ee5dbd72df63307209d55
jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 1 5a7a1e8ab8f25b86b63c377b303659289b895736 > jersey.jacobdevans.com IN SSHFP 3 2 1f50f790117dfedd329dbcf622a7d47551e12ff5913902c66a7da28e47de4f4b
then once published, you'd add VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
to your ssh_config or ~/.ssh/config
If/When google decides to flip on DNSSEC, you could ssh in without a hostkey prompt.
ssh jersey.jacobdevans.com
BUT my domain is not signed yet, so for now you'd see....
debug1: Server host key: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s
debug1: found 4 insecure fingerprints in DNS
debug1: matching host key fingerprint
found in DNS The authenticity of host 'jersey.jacobdevans.com (2605:6400:10:434::10)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is
SHA256:H1D3kBF9/t0ynbz2IqfUdVHhL/WROQLGan2ijkfeT0s. Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? no
edited Aug 28 '17 at 12:41
answered Oct 5 '16 at 22:07
Jacob EvansJacob Evans
5,53321337
5,53321337
add a comment |
add a comment |
Here is how to do a collection of hosts
define a collection of hosts
ssh_hosts:
- server1.domain.com
- server2.domain.com
- server3.domain.com
- server4.domain.com
- server5.domain.com
- server6.domain.com
- server7.domain.com
- server8.domain.com
- server9.domain.com
Then define two tasks to add the keys to known hosts:
- command: "ssh-keyscan item"
register: known_host_keys
with_items: "ssh_hosts"
tags:
- "ssh"
- name: Add ssh keys to know hosts
known_hosts:
name: "item.item"
key: "item.stdout"
path: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
with_items: "known_host_keys.results"
add a comment |
Here is how to do a collection of hosts
define a collection of hosts
ssh_hosts:
- server1.domain.com
- server2.domain.com
- server3.domain.com
- server4.domain.com
- server5.domain.com
- server6.domain.com
- server7.domain.com
- server8.domain.com
- server9.domain.com
Then define two tasks to add the keys to known hosts:
- command: "ssh-keyscan item"
register: known_host_keys
with_items: "ssh_hosts"
tags:
- "ssh"
- name: Add ssh keys to know hosts
known_hosts:
name: "item.item"
key: "item.stdout"
path: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
with_items: "known_host_keys.results"
add a comment |
Here is how to do a collection of hosts
define a collection of hosts
ssh_hosts:
- server1.domain.com
- server2.domain.com
- server3.domain.com
- server4.domain.com
- server5.domain.com
- server6.domain.com
- server7.domain.com
- server8.domain.com
- server9.domain.com
Then define two tasks to add the keys to known hosts:
- command: "ssh-keyscan item"
register: known_host_keys
with_items: "ssh_hosts"
tags:
- "ssh"
- name: Add ssh keys to know hosts
known_hosts:
name: "item.item"
key: "item.stdout"
path: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
with_items: "known_host_keys.results"
Here is how to do a collection of hosts
define a collection of hosts
ssh_hosts:
- server1.domain.com
- server2.domain.com
- server3.domain.com
- server4.domain.com
- server5.domain.com
- server6.domain.com
- server7.domain.com
- server8.domain.com
- server9.domain.com
Then define two tasks to add the keys to known hosts:
- command: "ssh-keyscan item"
register: known_host_keys
with_items: "ssh_hosts"
tags:
- "ssh"
- name: Add ssh keys to know hosts
known_hosts:
name: "item.item"
key: "item.stdout"
path: ~/.ssh/known_hosts
with_items: "known_host_keys.results"
answered Jan 23 '18 at 10:51
Vackar AfzalVackar Afzal
111
111
add a comment |
add a comment |
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4
For a test environment which is self-contained and physically secure, automated key acceptance may work just fine. But automatically accepting public keys in a production environment or across an untrusted network (such as the Internet) completely bypasses any protection against man-in-the-middle attacks that SSH would otherwise afford. The only valid way to make sure you're secure against MITM attacks is to verify the host's public key through some out-of-band trusted channel. There is no secure way to automate it without setting up a moderately complicated key signing infrastructure.
– Eil
Feb 15 '18 at 20:04