Universal hash functions with homomorphic XOR propertyIs (AES-)GCM parallelizable?Is this a correct understanding of Universal Hash Functions?Difficulty of forging MACs based on linear functions over $GFleft(2^nright)$
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Universal hash functions with homomorphic XOR property
Is (AES-)GCM parallelizable?Is this a correct understanding of Universal Hash Functions?Difficulty of forging MACs based on linear functions over $GFleft(2^nright)$
.everyoneloves__top-leaderboard:empty,.everyoneloves__mid-leaderboard:empty,.everyoneloves__bot-mid-leaderboard:empty margin-bottom:0;
$begingroup$
Let $H = h_r : U rightarrow [m]$. What are the currently known most efficient algorithms such that $H$
- is a universal family and
- fulfils the homomorphic XOR operation property $forall h in H forall x,y in U: h(x oplus y) = h(x) oplus h(y)$?
universal-hash
$endgroup$
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Let $H = h_r : U rightarrow [m]$. What are the currently known most efficient algorithms such that $H$
- is a universal family and
- fulfils the homomorphic XOR operation property $forall h in H forall x,y in U: h(x oplus y) = h(x) oplus h(y)$?
universal-hash
$endgroup$
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Let $H = h_r : U rightarrow [m]$. What are the currently known most efficient algorithms such that $H$
- is a universal family and
- fulfils the homomorphic XOR operation property $forall h in H forall x,y in U: h(x oplus y) = h(x) oplus h(y)$?
universal-hash
$endgroup$
Let $H = h_r : U rightarrow [m]$. What are the currently known most efficient algorithms such that $H$
- is a universal family and
- fulfils the homomorphic XOR operation property $forall h in H forall x,y in U: h(x oplus y) = h(x) oplus h(y)$?
universal-hash
universal-hash
asked Jun 4 at 11:15
Martin KrommMartin Kromm
485
485
add a comment |
add a comment |
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
$begingroup$
I believe that the internal GHASH function from GCM would meet that criteria (if you trim off the length word, and require universality only with equal length inputs [1]); it can be defined as:
$$operatornameGHASH_k( M_n, M_n-1, …, M_0 ) = sum k^i M_i$$
With the input $M_n, M_n-1, ..., M_0$ being the input message divided into 128 bit blocks, $k$ being the universal hash key, and the arithmetic (both the additions and the multiplications) done over the field $operatornameGF(2^128)$
It meets the criteria:
It is universal (for equal length messages); for random $k$ and any two distinct equal length messages $M, M'$, we have $operatornameGHASH_k(M) = operatornameGHASH_k(M')$ with probability $le |M| / 2^128$
It meets your homomophic requirement; this is because addition in $operatornameGF(2^128)$ is exclusive-or, and we have $k^i M_i oplus k^i M'_i = k^i( M_i oplus M'_i)$
It is quite efficient (especially with AES-NI instructions); I can't say that it's the most efficient possible...
[1]: You cannot get both the homomorphic properties and the universality (across messages of different lengths) to hold simultaneously. The homomorphic property requires that $h_k(0) = 0$ and that $h_k(00) = 0$, hence we have two different messages $0$ and $00$ which hash to the same value with high probability (actually, 1), thus $h_k$ is not a universal hash family.
$endgroup$
$begingroup$
Surely you mean CLMUL, not AES-NI?
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:01
$begingroup$
@SqueamishOssifrage Even though technically CLMUL isn't contained in the AES-NI, they usually appear together, so many people consider CLMUL to be part of AES-NI for all practical intents and purposes...
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:02
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Any polynomial evaluation hash or polynomial division hash, without length padding, has the property you seek:
Polynomial evauation. If $H_r(m) = m(r)$ where $m$ is a polynomial of zero constant term and degree $ell$ over some field and $r$ is an element of the field, then we have $$H_r(m) = m_1 r^ell + m_2 r^ell-1 + cdots + m_ell-1 r^2 + m_ell r,$$ so clearly $H_r(m + m') = H_r(m) + H_r(m')$. Standard examples of this form are Poly1305 and GHASH. If the field has characteristic 2, as in GHASH, then $+$ is xor. This obviously generalizes to multivariate polynomials too, e.g. the dot product $H_r_1,r_2(m_1 mathbin| m_2) = m_1 r_1 + m_2 r_2$ (which naturally attains a lower collision probability).
Polynomial division. If $H_f(m) = (m cdot x^n) bmod f$ where $m, f in operatornameGF(p)[x]$, and where $f$ is irreducible and of degree $n$, then clearly
beginalign
H_f(m + m')
&= bigl[(m + m') cdot x^nbigr] bmod f \
&= (m cdot x^n) bmod f + (m' cdot x^n) bmod f \
&= H_f(m) + H_f(m').
endalignPolynomial division hashes are related to CRCs and Rabin fingerprints. When $p = 2$, $+$ is xor.
Beware that multiplication in fields of characteristic 2 is generally not efficient in software, and that the most efficient software is riddled with timing side channels—unless you can fruitfully organize your computation to simultaneously compute a batch of (say) 64 instances of it in parallel using bitslicing.
$endgroup$
$begingroup$
Marim specifically asked it to be homomorphic over XOR; hence you're stuck with a field with characteristic 2.
$endgroup$
– poncho
Jun 4 at 15:45
$begingroup$
@poncho Yes. Just wanted to make sure that Martin is aware that characteristic 2 is dangerous in software!
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 15:46
$begingroup$
Actually I think that one could get say 64 parallel instances going using what poncho outlined in this older answer.
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:04
$begingroup$
@SEJPM Yes, but you need your message to be at least $8k$ bytes long to get at most a factor of $k$ improvement, and it's not a priori clear where the performance cutoff will be between a leaky table-driven implementation and a safe bitsliced implementation. My point is just that characteristic 2 can be dangerous for software because it requires you to do this analysis and tempts you into security-damaging performance tradeoffs.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:14
add a comment |
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2 Answers
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active
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2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
active
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votes
active
oldest
votes
$begingroup$
I believe that the internal GHASH function from GCM would meet that criteria (if you trim off the length word, and require universality only with equal length inputs [1]); it can be defined as:
$$operatornameGHASH_k( M_n, M_n-1, …, M_0 ) = sum k^i M_i$$
With the input $M_n, M_n-1, ..., M_0$ being the input message divided into 128 bit blocks, $k$ being the universal hash key, and the arithmetic (both the additions and the multiplications) done over the field $operatornameGF(2^128)$
It meets the criteria:
It is universal (for equal length messages); for random $k$ and any two distinct equal length messages $M, M'$, we have $operatornameGHASH_k(M) = operatornameGHASH_k(M')$ with probability $le |M| / 2^128$
It meets your homomophic requirement; this is because addition in $operatornameGF(2^128)$ is exclusive-or, and we have $k^i M_i oplus k^i M'_i = k^i( M_i oplus M'_i)$
It is quite efficient (especially with AES-NI instructions); I can't say that it's the most efficient possible...
[1]: You cannot get both the homomorphic properties and the universality (across messages of different lengths) to hold simultaneously. The homomorphic property requires that $h_k(0) = 0$ and that $h_k(00) = 0$, hence we have two different messages $0$ and $00$ which hash to the same value with high probability (actually, 1), thus $h_k$ is not a universal hash family.
$endgroup$
$begingroup$
Surely you mean CLMUL, not AES-NI?
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:01
$begingroup$
@SqueamishOssifrage Even though technically CLMUL isn't contained in the AES-NI, they usually appear together, so many people consider CLMUL to be part of AES-NI for all practical intents and purposes...
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:02
add a comment |
$begingroup$
I believe that the internal GHASH function from GCM would meet that criteria (if you trim off the length word, and require universality only with equal length inputs [1]); it can be defined as:
$$operatornameGHASH_k( M_n, M_n-1, …, M_0 ) = sum k^i M_i$$
With the input $M_n, M_n-1, ..., M_0$ being the input message divided into 128 bit blocks, $k$ being the universal hash key, and the arithmetic (both the additions and the multiplications) done over the field $operatornameGF(2^128)$
It meets the criteria:
It is universal (for equal length messages); for random $k$ and any two distinct equal length messages $M, M'$, we have $operatornameGHASH_k(M) = operatornameGHASH_k(M')$ with probability $le |M| / 2^128$
It meets your homomophic requirement; this is because addition in $operatornameGF(2^128)$ is exclusive-or, and we have $k^i M_i oplus k^i M'_i = k^i( M_i oplus M'_i)$
It is quite efficient (especially with AES-NI instructions); I can't say that it's the most efficient possible...
[1]: You cannot get both the homomorphic properties and the universality (across messages of different lengths) to hold simultaneously. The homomorphic property requires that $h_k(0) = 0$ and that $h_k(00) = 0$, hence we have two different messages $0$ and $00$ which hash to the same value with high probability (actually, 1), thus $h_k$ is not a universal hash family.
$endgroup$
$begingroup$
Surely you mean CLMUL, not AES-NI?
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:01
$begingroup$
@SqueamishOssifrage Even though technically CLMUL isn't contained in the AES-NI, they usually appear together, so many people consider CLMUL to be part of AES-NI for all practical intents and purposes...
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:02
add a comment |
$begingroup$
I believe that the internal GHASH function from GCM would meet that criteria (if you trim off the length word, and require universality only with equal length inputs [1]); it can be defined as:
$$operatornameGHASH_k( M_n, M_n-1, …, M_0 ) = sum k^i M_i$$
With the input $M_n, M_n-1, ..., M_0$ being the input message divided into 128 bit blocks, $k$ being the universal hash key, and the arithmetic (both the additions and the multiplications) done over the field $operatornameGF(2^128)$
It meets the criteria:
It is universal (for equal length messages); for random $k$ and any two distinct equal length messages $M, M'$, we have $operatornameGHASH_k(M) = operatornameGHASH_k(M')$ with probability $le |M| / 2^128$
It meets your homomophic requirement; this is because addition in $operatornameGF(2^128)$ is exclusive-or, and we have $k^i M_i oplus k^i M'_i = k^i( M_i oplus M'_i)$
It is quite efficient (especially with AES-NI instructions); I can't say that it's the most efficient possible...
[1]: You cannot get both the homomorphic properties and the universality (across messages of different lengths) to hold simultaneously. The homomorphic property requires that $h_k(0) = 0$ and that $h_k(00) = 0$, hence we have two different messages $0$ and $00$ which hash to the same value with high probability (actually, 1), thus $h_k$ is not a universal hash family.
$endgroup$
I believe that the internal GHASH function from GCM would meet that criteria (if you trim off the length word, and require universality only with equal length inputs [1]); it can be defined as:
$$operatornameGHASH_k( M_n, M_n-1, …, M_0 ) = sum k^i M_i$$
With the input $M_n, M_n-1, ..., M_0$ being the input message divided into 128 bit blocks, $k$ being the universal hash key, and the arithmetic (both the additions and the multiplications) done over the field $operatornameGF(2^128)$
It meets the criteria:
It is universal (for equal length messages); for random $k$ and any two distinct equal length messages $M, M'$, we have $operatornameGHASH_k(M) = operatornameGHASH_k(M')$ with probability $le |M| / 2^128$
It meets your homomophic requirement; this is because addition in $operatornameGF(2^128)$ is exclusive-or, and we have $k^i M_i oplus k^i M'_i = k^i( M_i oplus M'_i)$
It is quite efficient (especially with AES-NI instructions); I can't say that it's the most efficient possible...
[1]: You cannot get both the homomorphic properties and the universality (across messages of different lengths) to hold simultaneously. The homomorphic property requires that $h_k(0) = 0$ and that $h_k(00) = 0$, hence we have two different messages $0$ and $00$ which hash to the same value with high probability (actually, 1), thus $h_k$ is not a universal hash family.
edited Jun 4 at 14:39
Squeamish Ossifrage
28.8k144122
28.8k144122
answered Jun 4 at 12:30
ponchoponcho
96k2155250
96k2155250
$begingroup$
Surely you mean CLMUL, not AES-NI?
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:01
$begingroup$
@SqueamishOssifrage Even though technically CLMUL isn't contained in the AES-NI, they usually appear together, so many people consider CLMUL to be part of AES-NI for all practical intents and purposes...
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:02
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Surely you mean CLMUL, not AES-NI?
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:01
$begingroup$
@SqueamishOssifrage Even though technically CLMUL isn't contained in the AES-NI, they usually appear together, so many people consider CLMUL to be part of AES-NI for all practical intents and purposes...
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:02
$begingroup$
Surely you mean CLMUL, not AES-NI?
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:01
$begingroup$
Surely you mean CLMUL, not AES-NI?
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:01
$begingroup$
@SqueamishOssifrage Even though technically CLMUL isn't contained in the AES-NI, they usually appear together, so many people consider CLMUL to be part of AES-NI for all practical intents and purposes...
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:02
$begingroup$
@SqueamishOssifrage Even though technically CLMUL isn't contained in the AES-NI, they usually appear together, so many people consider CLMUL to be part of AES-NI for all practical intents and purposes...
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:02
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Any polynomial evaluation hash or polynomial division hash, without length padding, has the property you seek:
Polynomial evauation. If $H_r(m) = m(r)$ where $m$ is a polynomial of zero constant term and degree $ell$ over some field and $r$ is an element of the field, then we have $$H_r(m) = m_1 r^ell + m_2 r^ell-1 + cdots + m_ell-1 r^2 + m_ell r,$$ so clearly $H_r(m + m') = H_r(m) + H_r(m')$. Standard examples of this form are Poly1305 and GHASH. If the field has characteristic 2, as in GHASH, then $+$ is xor. This obviously generalizes to multivariate polynomials too, e.g. the dot product $H_r_1,r_2(m_1 mathbin| m_2) = m_1 r_1 + m_2 r_2$ (which naturally attains a lower collision probability).
Polynomial division. If $H_f(m) = (m cdot x^n) bmod f$ where $m, f in operatornameGF(p)[x]$, and where $f$ is irreducible and of degree $n$, then clearly
beginalign
H_f(m + m')
&= bigl[(m + m') cdot x^nbigr] bmod f \
&= (m cdot x^n) bmod f + (m' cdot x^n) bmod f \
&= H_f(m) + H_f(m').
endalignPolynomial division hashes are related to CRCs and Rabin fingerprints. When $p = 2$, $+$ is xor.
Beware that multiplication in fields of characteristic 2 is generally not efficient in software, and that the most efficient software is riddled with timing side channels—unless you can fruitfully organize your computation to simultaneously compute a batch of (say) 64 instances of it in parallel using bitslicing.
$endgroup$
$begingroup$
Marim specifically asked it to be homomorphic over XOR; hence you're stuck with a field with characteristic 2.
$endgroup$
– poncho
Jun 4 at 15:45
$begingroup$
@poncho Yes. Just wanted to make sure that Martin is aware that characteristic 2 is dangerous in software!
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 15:46
$begingroup$
Actually I think that one could get say 64 parallel instances going using what poncho outlined in this older answer.
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:04
$begingroup$
@SEJPM Yes, but you need your message to be at least $8k$ bytes long to get at most a factor of $k$ improvement, and it's not a priori clear where the performance cutoff will be between a leaky table-driven implementation and a safe bitsliced implementation. My point is just that characteristic 2 can be dangerous for software because it requires you to do this analysis and tempts you into security-damaging performance tradeoffs.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:14
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Any polynomial evaluation hash or polynomial division hash, without length padding, has the property you seek:
Polynomial evauation. If $H_r(m) = m(r)$ where $m$ is a polynomial of zero constant term and degree $ell$ over some field and $r$ is an element of the field, then we have $$H_r(m) = m_1 r^ell + m_2 r^ell-1 + cdots + m_ell-1 r^2 + m_ell r,$$ so clearly $H_r(m + m') = H_r(m) + H_r(m')$. Standard examples of this form are Poly1305 and GHASH. If the field has characteristic 2, as in GHASH, then $+$ is xor. This obviously generalizes to multivariate polynomials too, e.g. the dot product $H_r_1,r_2(m_1 mathbin| m_2) = m_1 r_1 + m_2 r_2$ (which naturally attains a lower collision probability).
Polynomial division. If $H_f(m) = (m cdot x^n) bmod f$ where $m, f in operatornameGF(p)[x]$, and where $f$ is irreducible and of degree $n$, then clearly
beginalign
H_f(m + m')
&= bigl[(m + m') cdot x^nbigr] bmod f \
&= (m cdot x^n) bmod f + (m' cdot x^n) bmod f \
&= H_f(m) + H_f(m').
endalignPolynomial division hashes are related to CRCs and Rabin fingerprints. When $p = 2$, $+$ is xor.
Beware that multiplication in fields of characteristic 2 is generally not efficient in software, and that the most efficient software is riddled with timing side channels—unless you can fruitfully organize your computation to simultaneously compute a batch of (say) 64 instances of it in parallel using bitslicing.
$endgroup$
$begingroup$
Marim specifically asked it to be homomorphic over XOR; hence you're stuck with a field with characteristic 2.
$endgroup$
– poncho
Jun 4 at 15:45
$begingroup$
@poncho Yes. Just wanted to make sure that Martin is aware that characteristic 2 is dangerous in software!
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 15:46
$begingroup$
Actually I think that one could get say 64 parallel instances going using what poncho outlined in this older answer.
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:04
$begingroup$
@SEJPM Yes, but you need your message to be at least $8k$ bytes long to get at most a factor of $k$ improvement, and it's not a priori clear where the performance cutoff will be between a leaky table-driven implementation and a safe bitsliced implementation. My point is just that characteristic 2 can be dangerous for software because it requires you to do this analysis and tempts you into security-damaging performance tradeoffs.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:14
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Any polynomial evaluation hash or polynomial division hash, without length padding, has the property you seek:
Polynomial evauation. If $H_r(m) = m(r)$ where $m$ is a polynomial of zero constant term and degree $ell$ over some field and $r$ is an element of the field, then we have $$H_r(m) = m_1 r^ell + m_2 r^ell-1 + cdots + m_ell-1 r^2 + m_ell r,$$ so clearly $H_r(m + m') = H_r(m) + H_r(m')$. Standard examples of this form are Poly1305 and GHASH. If the field has characteristic 2, as in GHASH, then $+$ is xor. This obviously generalizes to multivariate polynomials too, e.g. the dot product $H_r_1,r_2(m_1 mathbin| m_2) = m_1 r_1 + m_2 r_2$ (which naturally attains a lower collision probability).
Polynomial division. If $H_f(m) = (m cdot x^n) bmod f$ where $m, f in operatornameGF(p)[x]$, and where $f$ is irreducible and of degree $n$, then clearly
beginalign
H_f(m + m')
&= bigl[(m + m') cdot x^nbigr] bmod f \
&= (m cdot x^n) bmod f + (m' cdot x^n) bmod f \
&= H_f(m) + H_f(m').
endalignPolynomial division hashes are related to CRCs and Rabin fingerprints. When $p = 2$, $+$ is xor.
Beware that multiplication in fields of characteristic 2 is generally not efficient in software, and that the most efficient software is riddled with timing side channels—unless you can fruitfully organize your computation to simultaneously compute a batch of (say) 64 instances of it in parallel using bitslicing.
$endgroup$
Any polynomial evaluation hash or polynomial division hash, without length padding, has the property you seek:
Polynomial evauation. If $H_r(m) = m(r)$ where $m$ is a polynomial of zero constant term and degree $ell$ over some field and $r$ is an element of the field, then we have $$H_r(m) = m_1 r^ell + m_2 r^ell-1 + cdots + m_ell-1 r^2 + m_ell r,$$ so clearly $H_r(m + m') = H_r(m) + H_r(m')$. Standard examples of this form are Poly1305 and GHASH. If the field has characteristic 2, as in GHASH, then $+$ is xor. This obviously generalizes to multivariate polynomials too, e.g. the dot product $H_r_1,r_2(m_1 mathbin| m_2) = m_1 r_1 + m_2 r_2$ (which naturally attains a lower collision probability).
Polynomial division. If $H_f(m) = (m cdot x^n) bmod f$ where $m, f in operatornameGF(p)[x]$, and where $f$ is irreducible and of degree $n$, then clearly
beginalign
H_f(m + m')
&= bigl[(m + m') cdot x^nbigr] bmod f \
&= (m cdot x^n) bmod f + (m' cdot x^n) bmod f \
&= H_f(m) + H_f(m').
endalignPolynomial division hashes are related to CRCs and Rabin fingerprints. When $p = 2$, $+$ is xor.
Beware that multiplication in fields of characteristic 2 is generally not efficient in software, and that the most efficient software is riddled with timing side channels—unless you can fruitfully organize your computation to simultaneously compute a batch of (say) 64 instances of it in parallel using bitslicing.
edited Jun 4 at 16:03
answered Jun 4 at 14:50
Squeamish OssifrageSqueamish Ossifrage
28.8k144122
28.8k144122
$begingroup$
Marim specifically asked it to be homomorphic over XOR; hence you're stuck with a field with characteristic 2.
$endgroup$
– poncho
Jun 4 at 15:45
$begingroup$
@poncho Yes. Just wanted to make sure that Martin is aware that characteristic 2 is dangerous in software!
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 15:46
$begingroup$
Actually I think that one could get say 64 parallel instances going using what poncho outlined in this older answer.
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:04
$begingroup$
@SEJPM Yes, but you need your message to be at least $8k$ bytes long to get at most a factor of $k$ improvement, and it's not a priori clear where the performance cutoff will be between a leaky table-driven implementation and a safe bitsliced implementation. My point is just that characteristic 2 can be dangerous for software because it requires you to do this analysis and tempts you into security-damaging performance tradeoffs.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:14
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Marim specifically asked it to be homomorphic over XOR; hence you're stuck with a field with characteristic 2.
$endgroup$
– poncho
Jun 4 at 15:45
$begingroup$
@poncho Yes. Just wanted to make sure that Martin is aware that characteristic 2 is dangerous in software!
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 15:46
$begingroup$
Actually I think that one could get say 64 parallel instances going using what poncho outlined in this older answer.
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:04
$begingroup$
@SEJPM Yes, but you need your message to be at least $8k$ bytes long to get at most a factor of $k$ improvement, and it's not a priori clear where the performance cutoff will be between a leaky table-driven implementation and a safe bitsliced implementation. My point is just that characteristic 2 can be dangerous for software because it requires you to do this analysis and tempts you into security-damaging performance tradeoffs.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:14
$begingroup$
Marim specifically asked it to be homomorphic over XOR; hence you're stuck with a field with characteristic 2.
$endgroup$
– poncho
Jun 4 at 15:45
$begingroup$
Marim specifically asked it to be homomorphic over XOR; hence you're stuck with a field with characteristic 2.
$endgroup$
– poncho
Jun 4 at 15:45
$begingroup$
@poncho Yes. Just wanted to make sure that Martin is aware that characteristic 2 is dangerous in software!
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 15:46
$begingroup$
@poncho Yes. Just wanted to make sure that Martin is aware that characteristic 2 is dangerous in software!
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 15:46
$begingroup$
Actually I think that one could get say 64 parallel instances going using what poncho outlined in this older answer.
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:04
$begingroup$
Actually I think that one could get say 64 parallel instances going using what poncho outlined in this older answer.
$endgroup$
– SEJPM♦
Jun 4 at 16:04
$begingroup$
@SEJPM Yes, but you need your message to be at least $8k$ bytes long to get at most a factor of $k$ improvement, and it's not a priori clear where the performance cutoff will be between a leaky table-driven implementation and a safe bitsliced implementation. My point is just that characteristic 2 can be dangerous for software because it requires you to do this analysis and tempts you into security-damaging performance tradeoffs.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:14
$begingroup$
@SEJPM Yes, but you need your message to be at least $8k$ bytes long to get at most a factor of $k$ improvement, and it's not a priori clear where the performance cutoff will be between a leaky table-driven implementation and a safe bitsliced implementation. My point is just that characteristic 2 can be dangerous for software because it requires you to do this analysis and tempts you into security-damaging performance tradeoffs.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Jun 4 at 16:14
add a comment |
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